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Deepesh Data†, Gowtham R. Kurri†, Jithin Ravi, Vinod M. Prabhakaran
Abstract
We consider interactive computation of randomized functions between two users with the following privacy
requirement: the interaction should not reveal to either user any extra information about the other user’s input and
output other than what can be inferred from the user’s own input and output. We also consider the case where
privacy is required against only one of the users. For both cases, we give single-letter expressions for feasibility and
optimal rates of communication. Then we discuss the role of common randomness and interaction in both privacy
settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a function computation problem between two users (Figure 1). They observe memoryless sources
(inputs) X and Y , respectively, and communicate interactively over a noiseless communication link to compute
randomized functions (outputs) Z1 and Z2, respectively. Common and private randomness which is independent of
the inputs X and Y is available to both of them. They want to compute the functions in such a way that neither
of them learn any extra information about the other user’s input and output other than what their own input and
output reveal. We assume that the users are honest-but-curious, i.e., they faithfully follow the given protocol, but
will try to infer extra information at the end of the protocol. This secure computation problem is specified by a pair
(qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ), where qXY is the input distribution and qZ1Z2|XY specifies the randomized function. Our goal is
to determine whether a function is securely computable and, when it is computable, determine the optimal rates of
interactive communication required.
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Fig. 1: Secure interactive randomized function computation. The case where Alice starts the communication is
shown. Privacy against Alice requires that M1, · · · ,Mr should not reveal anything about (Y n, Zn2 ) other than what
can be inferred from (Xn, Zn1 ). Similar conditions should hold for privacy against Bob.
Two-user interactive computation (with no privacy) has been extensively studied in the computer science literature
(see, e.g., [1], [2] and references therein) as well as in the information theory literature [3]–[5]. In [3], Kaspi
considered two-user interactive source coding. Interactive computation of deterministic functions was addressed by
Orlitsky and Roche [4] and also by Ma and Ishwar [5]. Interactive schemes for computing randomized functions
were studied by Yassaee et al. [6] and Tyagi et al. [7].
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2There is also a large body of work on secure communication and secret-key agreement (see, e.g., [8]–[13]). In
these problems privacy is required against a third-party eavesdropper. In contrast, in the secure computation problem
in this paper, privacy is required against the legitimate users themselves.
Secure computation (with privacy against the users themselves) has been studied in cryptography under compu-
tational as well as information theoretic secrecy (see [14] and references therein). It is know that not all functions
are information theoretically securely computable by two users interacting over a noiseless link, whereas, under
computational secrecy, all functions are securely computable [15], [16]1. A combinatorial characterization of two-
user securely computable deterministic functions was given in [19], [20]. An alternative characterization using
the common randomness generated by interactive deterministic protocols was provided in [21]. A combinatorial
characterization of two-user securely computable randomized functions is still not known; some partial results were
obtained in [18], [22]. A characterization of two-user securely computable output distributions with no inputs and
no common randomness was given in [23]. In contrast to these, function computation with privacy against an
eavesdropper who has access to the interactive communication was studied in [24].
Secure computation among n users (n > 2) with pairwise, private, error-free communication links was studied
in [25], [26]. It was shown that any function can be securely computed even if any t < n2 honest-but-curious users
collude2. The problem of finding optimal protocols from a communication point-of-view remains mostly open [27].
We consider two-user interactive secure function computation in two privacy settings: (i) when privacy is required
against both users, and (ii) when privacy is required against only one of the users. Our main contributions are as
follows:
• For each of the privacy settings mentioned above, we show that the set of asymptotically securely computable
functions (see Definition 2) is the same as the set of one-shot, perfectly securely computable functions.
Furthermore, we give single-letter expressions for the asymptotic rate regions (Theorems 1, 2, 4 and 5).
• We show that for a class of functions (including deterministic functions), checking secure computability (with
privacy requirement against both users) is equivalent to checking whether cut-set lower bounds for computation
with no privacy requirements can be met (Theorem 3).
• When privacy is required against both users, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for common
randomness to be helpful in improving the communication rate (see Section IV-A).
• When no privacy is required, any function can be computed in two rounds by exchanging the inputs. However,
Ma and Ishwar [5] showed that there are functions for which more rounds of interaction can strictly improve
the communication rate. For a function securely computable with privacy against both users, (depending on
the function) a certain minimum number of rounds of interaction may be required. In contrast with function
computation without any privacy required, we show that further interaction does not improve the communication
rate (see Section IV-A). However, when privacy is required against only one user, we give an example where
one extra round from the minimum number of rounds required for secure computability strictly improves the
communication rate (see Section IV-B).
• For (one-shot) perfectly secure computation, we derive upper and lower bounds on the optimal expected length
of transmission in the non-interactive setting where only Bob produces an output using a single transmission
from Alice (Theorems 7, 8 and 10).
The paper is organized as follows. We present our problem formulation in Section II and provide results on
feasibility and rate region characterization in Section III. The role of interaction and common randomness is
discussed in Section IV. We illustrate the communication cost of security using an example in Section V. Bounds
on the optimal expected length of transmission for perfectly secure non-interactive computation are provided in
Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND DEFINITIONS
A secure randomized function computation problem is specified by a pair
(
qXY , qZ1Z2|XY
)
, where X,Y, Z1 and
Z2 take values in finite sets X ,Y,Z1 and Z2, respectively. Inputs to Alice and Bob are Xn and Y n, respectively,
1Note that if the two users have access to correlated random variables or a noisy channel, a larger class of functions may be securely
computed [17]. A characterization of such stochastic resources which allow any function to be securely computed is given in [18]. In this
paper, we do not consider such resources.
2For malicious cases where colluding users may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol, secure computation of all functions is feasible under
a stricter threshold of t < n
3
colluding users [25], [26].
3where (Xi, Yi), i = 1, . . . , n, are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with distribution qXY . Both users
have access to a common random variable W , which is independent of (Xn, Y n) and uniformly distributed over
its alphabet W = [1 : 2nR0 ]. The users interactively communicate in r rounds over a noiseless bidirectional link.
Their goal is to securely compute the randomized function qZ1Z2|XY , i.e., to output Z
n
1 and Z
n
2 , respectively, such
that they are (approximately) distributed according to qZn1 Zn2 |XnY n(z
n
1 , z
n
2 |xn, yn) := Πni=1qZ1Z2|XY (z1i, z2i|xi, yi)
while (approximately) preserving privacy in the sense that the average amount of additional information that a user
learns about the input and output of the other user goes to zero as n tends to infinity. We consider this problem in
two different cases: (i) when privacy is required against both users, and (ii) when privacy is required against only
one of the users. In both cases we wish to determine whether secure computation is feasible in any arbitrary r ∈ N
number of rounds and when feasible, characterize the set of achievable rates. Next we formally state the problem
assuming that Alice starts the communication.
Definition 1. A protocol Πn with r interactive rounds of communication consists of
• a set of r randomized encoders with p.m.f.’s pE1(mi|xn, w,m[1:i−1]) for odd numbers i ∈ [1 : r] and
pE2(mi|yn, w,m[1:i−1]) for even numbers i ∈ [1 : r], where Mi is the message transmitted in the ith round,
• two randomized decoders pD1(zn1 |xn, w,m[1:r]) and pD2(zn2 |yn, w,m[1:r]).
Let p(induced)W,Xn,Y n,M[1:r],Zn1 ,Zn2 denote the induced distribution of the protocol Πn.
p(induced)(w, xn, yn,m[1:r], z
n
1 , z
n
2 ) =
1
2nR0
n∏
i=1
q(xi, yi)×∏
i:odd
pE1(mi|xn, w,m[1:i−1])
∏
j:even
pE2(mj |yn, w,m[1:j−1])

× pD1(zn1 |xn, w,m[1:r])pD2(zn2 |yn, w,m[1:r]). (1)
Definition 2. (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable in r rounds with privacy against both users
if there exists a sequence of protocols Πn such that, for every  > 0, there exists a large enough n such that∥∥∥p(induced)Xn,Y n,Zn1 ,Zn2 − qXn,Y n,Zn1 ,Zn2 ∥∥∥1 ≤ , (2)
I(M[1:r],W ;Y
n, Zn2 |Xn, Zn1 ) ≤ n, (3)
I(M[1:r],W ;X
n, Zn1 |Y n, Zn2 ) ≤ n, (4)
where qXn,Y n,Zn1 ,Zn2 (x
n, yn, zn1 , z
n
2 ) := Π
n
i=1
[
qXY (xi, yi)qZ1Z2|XY (z1i, z2i|xi, yi)
]
.
Note that (3) is the privacy condition against Alice. It requires that the rate of additional information that Alice
learns about Bob’s input and output other than what can be inferred from her own input and output is negligible.
Similarly, (4) is the privacy condition against Bob.
Definition 3. (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is perfectly securely computable in r rounds with privacy against both users if there
exists a protocol Πn with n = 1 such that (2)-(4) are satisfied with  = 0.
Definition 4. An (n,R0, R12, R21) protocol is a protocol Πn such that the alphabet of W is W = [1 : 2nR0 ] and
R12 =
1
n
∑
i:odd
log |Mi|,
R21 =
1
n
∑
i:even
log |Mi|,
where Mi is the alphabet of Mi, i ∈ [1 : r].
For a given function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ), a rate triple (R0, R12, R21) is said to be achievable in r rounds with
privacy against both users if there exists a sequence of (n,R0, R12, R21) protocols such that, for every  > 0,
there exists a large enough n satisfying (2)-(4). The rate region RAB−pvtA (r) with privacy against both users is
the closure of all the achievable rate triples (R0, R12, R21). The subscript A in RAB−pvtA (r) denotes that Alice
4starts the communication and the superscript AB-pvt denotes that privacy is against Alice and Bob. RAB−pvtB (r)
can be defined in a similar fashion for the scenario when Bob starts the communication. We are interested in the
region RAB−pvt(r) := RAB−pvtA (r)
⋃RAB−pvtB (r) and the minimum sum-rate RAB−pvtsum (r,R0) := min{R12 +R21 :
(R0, R12, R21) ∈ RAB−pvt(r)}. Let RAB−pvt :=
⋃∞
r=1RAB−pvt(r). Notice that the above definitions are for the case
when privacy is required against both users. RA−pvtA (r), RB−pvtA (r) and so on can also be defined in a similar fashion
for the cases when privacy is required only against Alice and privacy is required only against Bob, respectively.
For example, for the case when privacy is required only against Alice, the definitions will require (2)-(3) only and
not (4).
III. FEASIBILITY AND RATE REGION
We present single-letter characterizations of securely computable randomized functions and the rate regions.
Detailed proofs can be found in Appendix A. The following theorem is about feasibility. Part (i) states that
asymptotic secure computability (in r rounds) of a function implies one-shot (i.e., n = 1) perfectly secure
computability (in the same number of rounds). Part (ii) shows that asymptotic secure computability depends on
the input distribution qXY only through its support, supp(qXY ) := {(x, y) : qXY (x, y) > 0}. In fact, asymptotic
secure computability of a function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is preserved even with another input distribution q˜XY whose
support is a subset of supp(qXY ).
Theorem 1. (i) (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both users using
an r-round protocol in which Alice starts the communication if and only if there exists a conditional p.m.f.
p(u[1:r]|x, y, z1, z2) satisfying
Ui − (U[1:i−1], X)− Y, if i is odd, (5)
Ui − (U[1:i−1], Y )−X, if i is even, (6)
Z1 − (U[1:r], X)− (Y,Z2), (7)
Z2 − (U[1:r], Y )− (X,Z1), (8)
U[1:r] − (X,Z1)− (Y,Z2), (9)
U[1:r] − (Y,Z2)− (X,Z1), (10)
|U1| ≤ |X ||Y||Z1||Z2|+ 1 and |Ui| ≤ |X ||Y||Z1||Z2|
∏i−1
j=1 |Uj |+ 1, ∀i > 1.
(ii) If a function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both users using an r-
round protocol, then (q˜XY , qZ1Z2|XY ), where supp(q˜XY ) ⊆ supp(qXY ), is also asymptotically securely computable
with privacy against both users using an r-round protocol.
Remark 1. Notice that Alice can generate common randomness by sending some of her private randomness along
with the message in the first round. So, the presence or absence of common randomness should not affect the secure
computability of a function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ). As expected, the condition in part (i) does not depend on common
randomness.
Remark 2. Part (i) of Theorem 1 shows that, for our problem, asymptotic secure computability is equivalent to one-
shot perfect secure computability. It is interesting to note that this is not the case for all secure function computation
problems. Consider the problem of function computation with privacy against an eavesdropper [24]. Tyagi et al.
[24] considers the asymptotic setting where a group of users with correlated inputs interact noiselessly to compute a
common function. The privacy requirement is that the amount of information that an eavesdropper learns about the
function from the communication vanishes asymptotically. [24, Theorem 2] states that a function g is asymptotically
securely computable by two users with privacy against an eavesdropper if H(g(X,Y )) < I(X;Y ) (and only if
H(g(X,Y )) ≤ I(X;Y )). In this setup, perfectly secure computability with privacy against an eavesdropper can
be defined analogous to the asymptotic secure computability with privacy against an eavesdropper. Below, we
give an example of a function which is computable with asymptotic security (with privacy from an eavesdropper)
but not with perfect security. Furthermore, unlike part (ii) of Theorem 1, asymptotic secure computability with
privacy against an eavesdropper depends on the input distribution qXY not just through its support supp(qXY ) [24,
Theorem 2].
5Example 1. Consider a doubly symmetric binary source DSBS(a) with joint distribution qXY (x, y) = 0.5(1 −
a)1{x=y} + 0.5a1{x 6=y}, a ∈ [0, 0.5] and x, y ∈ {0, 1}. Let the function to be computed by both users is g(x, y) =
x ⊕ y, where ‘⊕’ is addition modulo-2. Choose a ∈ (0, 0.5] s.t. h(a) < 1 − h(a) (where h(·) denotes the binary
entropy function), so that g is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against the eavesdropper (by [24,
Theorem 2]). We show that there does not exist a protocol that perfectly securely computes g with privacy from
an eavesdropper. If g is perfectly securely computable with privacy against an eavesdropper, then there exists some
r and a conditional p.m.f p(u[1:r]|x, y) satisfying (5)-(8) with Z1 = Z2 = G := g(X,Y ) (for correctness), and
I(G;U[1:r]) = 0 (for privacy against the eavesdropper). For simplicity, we write U for U[1:r]. Suppose there exists
a conditional p.m.f. satisfying the above conditions. In particular, we have
(X ⊕ Y )− (U,X)− Y, (11)
(X ⊕ Y )− (U, Y )−X, (12)
I(X ⊕ Y ;U) = 0. (13)
(11) implies that I(X ⊕ Y ;Y |U,X) = 0, which in turn implies that H(Y |U,X) = 0 (i.e., Y is a function of
(U,X)) since H(Y |U,X,X⊕Y ) = 0. Similarly, (12) implies that H(X|U, Y ) = 0, i.e., X is a function of (U, Y ).
Now if p(u, x, y) > 0, then we claim that p(u) = p(u, x, y) + p(u, x¯, y¯) (x¯ denotes the compliment of x, i.e.,
x¯ = 1 − x). To see this, if p(u, x, y) > 0, note that p(u, x, y¯) = 0 since Y is a function of (U,X). Similarly,
p(u, x¯, y) = 0 since X is a function of (U, Y ). Hence, when p(u) > 0, since there exists x, y s.t. p(u, x, y) > 0, we
can write p(u) = p(u, x, y) + p(u, x¯, y¯). Hence, X ⊕ Y is a function of U as x⊕ y = x¯⊕ y¯, ∀x, y ∈ {0, 1}. This
is a contradiction to (13) as a ∈ (0, 0.5]. Therefore, g is not perfectly securely computable with privacy against an
eavesdropper.
Remark 3. If there is no bound on the number of rounds, note that part (i) does not give a computable character-
ization of asymptotically securely computable functions. This problem, which was partially addressed in [18], [22]
for full support input distributions, remains open.
Proof sketch of Theorem 1: We give a proof sketch here. A detailed proof can be found in Appendix A. For
part (i), it is trivial to see the ‘if’ part since (5)-(10) define an r-round perfectly secure protocol of blocklength one,
i.e., the protocol satisfies (2)-(4) with n = 1 and  = 0. For the ‘only if’ part, we first single-letterize the privacy
constraints (3) and (4). We then single-letterize (2) and the Markov chains that are implied by the joint distribution
in (1) along the lines of two-way source coding of Kaspi [3], interactive (deterministic) function computation of Ma
and Ishwar [5], and channel simulation of Yassaee et al. [6]. Then by using the continuity of mutual information
and total variation distance in the probability simplex, we show that, if a function is computable with asymptotic
security, it is also computable with perfect security. For part (ii), we show that a protocol which securely computes
(qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) will also securely compute the function (q˜XY , qZ1Z2|XY ), where supp(q˜XY ) ⊆ supp(qXY ).
Next theorem characterizes the rate region RAB−pvtA (r)
Theorem 2. If a function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both users,
then RAB−pvtA (r) is given by the set of all non-negative rate triples (R0, R12, R21) such that
R12 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ), (14)
R21 ≥ I(Y ;Z1|X), (15)
R0 +R12 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ) + I(U1;Z1, Z2|X,Y ), (16)
R0 +R12 +R21 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ) + I(Y ;Z1|X) + I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ), (17)
for some conditional p.m.f. p(u[1:r]|x, y, z1, z2) satisfying (5)-(10), |U1| ≤ |X ||Y||Z1||Z2|+ 5 and
|Ui| ≤ |X ||Y||Z1||Z2|
∏i−1
j=1 |Uj |+ 4, ∀i > 1.
Remark 4. Inequality (16) on R0 +R12 makes the rate region RAB−pvtA (r) possibly asymmetric. This is, in fact,
due to the assumption that Alice starts the communication. This is similar to the possible asymmetry of the rate
region observed in channel simulation [6, Theorem 1].
6Remark 5. Substituting X = Y = ∅ in part (i) of Theorem 1 recovers a result of [23] which states that a
distribution qZ1,Z2 is securely computable (i.e., securely sampleable as there are no inputs here) if and only if
C(Z1;Z2) = I(Z1;Z2), where C(Z1;Z2) := min
Z1−W−Z2
I(Z1, Z2;W ) is Wyner common information [28]. To see
this, note that
C(Z1;Z2) = I(Z1;Z2) + min
Z1−W−Z2
(I(Z1;W |Z2) + I(Z2;W |Z1)) .
Furthermore, when R0 = 0, Theorem 2 implies that the optimal sum-rate is R12 +R21 = C(Z1;Z2) = I(Z1;Z2).
This follows from (24) (proved later) and the fact that I(U1;Z1, Z2|X,Y ) ≤ I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y ).
Remark 6. For a function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ), which is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both
users using a one round protocol in which Alice starts the communication, (15) purports to give a lower bound
on the rate of communication from Bob to Alice. However, note that this lower bound I(Y ;Z1|X) is in fact zero.
To see this, notice that if a function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against
both users using a 1-round protocol in which Alice starts the communication, it follows from U −X −Y and (23)
(proved later) that I(Y ;Z1|X) = 0.
Proof sketch of Theorem 2: We give a proof sketch here. A detailed proof can be found in Appendix A. Our
proof of achievability is along similar lines as the achievability proof of channel simulation [6, Theorem 1]. We
modify this proof to give a protocol which also accounts for privacy . For the converse, we first single-letterize
the privacy constraints (3) and (4). The rest of the converse is in the spirit of two-way source coding of Kaspi [3],
interactive (deterministic) function computation of Ma and Ishwar [5], and channel simulation of Yassaee et al. [6].
This gives a rate region defined by the set of non-negative rate triples (R0, R12, R21) such that
R12 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ), (18)
R21 ≥ I(Y ;U[1:r]|X), (19)
R0 +R12 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) + I(U1;Z1, Z2|X,Y ), (20)
R0 +R12 +R21 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) + I(Y ;U[1:r]|X) + I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y ), (21)
for conditional p.m.f. p(u[1:r], z1, z2|x, y) satisfying (5)-(10). Notice that constraints (18)-(21) appear in channel
simulation [6, Theorem 1] also, where the conditional p.m.f. p(u[1:r], z1, z2|x, y) satisfies (5)-(8). The above region
reduces to the form mentioned in Theorem 2 because of simplification possible here due to the additional privacy
constraints (9)-(10), which gives us (as shown in the detailed proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A)
I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) = I(X;Z2|Y ), (22)
I(Y ;U[1:r]|X) = I(Y ;Z1|X), (23)
I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y ) = I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ). (24)
Let us denote the minimum number of rounds required for secure computation by rmin, i.e., the smallest r such
that there exists auxiliary random variables U[1:r] which makes the function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) one-shot perfectly
securely computable with either Alice or Bob starting the communication. Note that Theorem 2 is for any fixed
number of rounds r. The following corollary gives the region RAB−pvt. Notice that the description of region
RAB−pvt does not involve any auxiliary random variables.
Corollary 1. If (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both users, then
RAB−pvt is given by the set of all non-negative rate triples (R0, R12, R21) such that
R12 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ), (25)
R21 ≥ I(Y ;Z1|X), (26)
R0 +R12 +R21 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ) + I(Y ;Z1|X) + I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ). (27)
Furthermore, RAB−pvt(rmin + 1) = RAB−pvt.
Proof of Corollary 1: It suffices to prove that RAB−pvt(rmin + 1) = Ropt, where Ropt is defined to be
the set of all non-negative rate tuples (R0, R12, R21) such that (25)-(27) are satisfied. From Theorem 2 it is
7easy to see that RAB−pvt(rmin + 1) ⊆ Ropt. Suppose rmin occurs when Alice starts the communication. Then
by Theorem 2 there exists random variables U[1:rmin] with conditional p.m.f. p(u[1:rmin]|x, y, z1, z2) satisfying (5)-
(10). For the other direction, take a point (R0, R12, R21) ∈ Ropt. We find new random variables U ′[1:rmin+1] so that
(R0, R12, R21) becomes a point in RAB−pvtB (rmin + 1). Define U ′1 = ∅ and U ′i = Ui−1 for i > 1. This gives us that
(R0, R12, R21) ∈ RAB−pvtB (rmin + 1). Hence (R0, R12, R21) ∈ RAB−pvt(rmin + 1).
For computing randomized function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) without any privacy guarantees, the cut-set lower bounds
can be shown to be (see Appendix B for details) R12 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ), R21 ≥ I(Y ;Z1|X).
Part (i) of the following theorem states that if a function is securely computable with privacy against both users,
then these cut-set lower bounds (for function computation without any privacy requirement) are achievable. The
converse is not true in general3. However, part (ii) of the theorem states that a converse holds for a class of
functions including deterministic functions4. Let the rate region RNo-privacyA (r) be defined analogous to RAB−pvtA (r)
(except that only correctness condition (2) is required).
Theorem 3. (i) If a function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is securely computable in r rounds with privacy against both users,
then there exists R0 such that
(
R0, I(X;Z2|Y ), I(Y ;Z1|X)
) ∈ RNo-privacyA (r).
(ii) Suppose the function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is such that H(Z1|X,Y, Z2) = 0 & H(Z2|X,Y, Z1) = 0 (e.g., a
deterministic function). If there exists R0 such that
(
R0, I(X;Z2|Y ), I(Y ;Z1|X)
) ∈ RNo-privacyA (r), then the function
is securely computable in r rounds with privacy against both users.
We prove this in Appendix A. Part (i) will follow from Theorem 2. We prove part (ii) by showing that, for the
class of functions mentioned in Theorem 3, any protocol for computation without privacy that meets the cut-set
bounds must satisfy the privacy conditions as well.
When privacy is required against only one user:
Note that when privacy is required only against Alice, any function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) can be securely computed
using a 2-round protocol in which Alice starts the communication. Alice can transmit her input to Bob who can
compute the function according to qZ1Z2|XY , and send Z1 back to Alice. Part (i) of the following theorem considers
the feasibility of 1 round protocols. Similar to part (i) of Theorem 2, it states that asymptotic secure computability
implies one-shot perfectly secure computability. Part (ii) characterizes the rate region for an arbitrary number of
rounds r.
Theorem 4. (i) (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy only against Alice using a 1-
round protocol in which Alice starts the communication if and only if there exists a conditional p.m.f. p(u1|x, y, z1, z2)
satisfying (a) U1 −X − Y , (b) Z1 − (U1, X)− (Y, Z2), (c) Z2 − (U1, Y )− (X,Z1), (d) U1 − (X,Z1)− (Y,Z2).
Furthermore, if a function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy only against Alice
using a 1-round protocol, then (q˜XY , qZ1Z2|XY ), where supp(q˜XY ) ⊆ supp(qXY ), is also asymptotically securely
computable with privacy only against Alice using a 1-round protocol.
(ii) RA−pvtA (r) is given by the set of all non-negative rate triples (R0, R12, R21) such that
R12 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ),
R21 ≥ I(Y ;Z1|X),
R0 +R12 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) + I(U1;Z1|X,Y ),
R0 +R12 +R21 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) + I(Y ;Z1|X) + I(U[1:r];Z1|X,Y ),
for some conditional p.m.f. p(u[1:r]|x, y, z1, z2) satisfying (5)-(8) and (9).
When privacy is required only against Bob, any function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is securely computable in at most 3
rounds with Alice starting the communication. To see this, note that Alice may transmit nothing in the first round,
Bob can transmit his input to Alice in the second round. She can then compute the function according to qZ1Z2|XY ,
3To see this, suppose X = Y = ∅, then any function qZ1Z2 can be computed by using common randomness alone (see Wyner common
information problem [28]), i.e., by meeting the cut-set lower bounds which in this case are zero, I(X;Z2|Y ) = 0 = I(Y ;Z1|X). Assume
that qZ1Z2 is such that C(Z1;Z2) 6= I(Z1;Z2). Then qZ1Z2 is not securely computable in view of Remark 5.
4The characterization of all the functions for which the converse holds remains open.
8and send Z2 back to Bob in the third round. Part (i) of the following theorem considers the feasibility of 1 and
2 round protocols. Similar to part (i) of Theorems 2 and 4, it states that asymptotic secure computability implies
perfectly secure computability. Part (ii) characterizes the rate region for an arbitrary number of rounds r.
Theorem 5. (i) (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy only against Bob using
an r-round protocol in which Alice starts the communication if and only if there exists a conditional p.m.f.
p(u[1:r]|x, y, z1, z2) satisfying (5)-(8) and (10), for r = 1, 2. Furthermore, if a function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptot-
ically securely computable with privacy only against Bob using a 1(resp. 2)-round protocol, then (q˜XY , qZ1Z2|XY ),
where supp(q˜XY ) ⊆ supp(qXY ), is also asymptotically securely computable with privacy only against Bob using a
1(resp. 2)-round protocol.
(ii) RB−pvtA (r) is given by the set of all non-negative rate triples (R0, R12, R21) such that
R12 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ),
R21 ≥ I(Y ;U[1:r]|X),
R0 +R12 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ) + I(U1;Z2|X,Y ),
R0 +R12 +R21 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ) + I(Y ;U[1:r]|X) + I(U[1:r];Z2|X,Y ),
for some conditional pmf p(u[1:r]|x, y, z1, z2) satisfying (5)-(8) and (10).
Note that similar cardinality bounds on auxiliary random variables as in Theorems 1 and 2 hold for Theorems 4
and 5 also.
IV. ROLE OF INTERACTION AND COMMON RANDOMNESS
When no privacy is required, any function can be computed in two rounds by exchanging the inputs. However,
as Ma and Ishwar [5] have shown, there are functions for which more rounds of interaction can strictly improve the
communication rate. When privacy is required against both users, if a function is securely computable, depending on
the function, by Theorem 1, a certain minimum number of rounds of interaction is required for secure computation.
Recall that we defined rmin to be the smallest r such that there exists auxiliary random variables U[1:r] which makes
the function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) asymptotically (and perfectly) securely computable with either Alice or Bob starting
the communication. The discussion on the role of interaction below will focus on whether increasing the number
of rounds beyond rmin helps to reduce the communication rate. On common randomness, it is clear from Remark 1
that its absence does not affect the secure computability of a function. The discussion on the role of common
randomness will focus on its effect on the communication rate.
A. Privacy required against both users
It can be inferred from Corollary 1 that when privacy is required against both users, interaction will not help to
enlarge the rate region beyond rmin + 1 rounds.
• Interaction does not improve the minimum sum-rate, i.e., RAB−pvtsum (r,R0) = RAB−pvtsum (rmin, R0), for
r ≥ rmin, R0 ≥ 0. Interaction does not help to enlarge the rate region when (i) I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ) = 0, e.g.,
when the functions are deterministic, or (ii) the common randomness rate is large enough.
Fix some R0. Since I(U1;Z1, Z2|X,Y ) ≤ I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y ) = I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ) (equality follows from (24)),
we get from Theorem 2 that, for any r ≥ rmin, the optimal sum-rate RAB−pvtsum (r,R0) is I(X;Z2|Y )+I(Y ;Z1|X)+[
I(Z1;Z2|X,Y )− R0
]
+
, where [x]+ = max{x, 0}. Since this rate is same for any r ≥ rmin, the sum-rate cannot
be reduced with more rounds of interaction, i.e., RAB−pvtsum (r,R0) = R
AB−pvt
sum (rmin, R0), for r ≥ rmin, R0 ≥ 0.
When I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ) = 0, clearly (17) is redundant. For the same reasons as above, (16) is also redundant and
the rate region is characterized by (14) and (15). Since these do not depend on the auxiliary random variables,
the rate region remains the same for all r ≥ rmin. When the common randomness rate is large enough, it can be
observed from Theorem 2 that the rate region is again characterized by (14) and (15) and hence interaction does
not enlarge the rate region. Now, since RAB−pvtsum (r,R0) = R
AB−pvt
sum (rmin, R0), for r ≥ rmin, R0 ≥ 0, we will relax
the first argument r of RAB−pvtsum (r,R0) in the sequel and simply write R
AB−pvt
sum (R0) for R
AB−pvt
sum (r,R0), for any
r ≥ rmin.
9• For a function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ), common randomness can improve the minimum sum-rate (i.e.,
RAB−pvtsum (R0) < R
AB−pvt
sum (0), for all R0 > 0) if and only if Z1 and Z2 are conditionally dependent given
(X,Y ). Hence, for deterministic functions, common randomness does not reduce the sum-rate.
Suppose Z1 and Z2 are conditionally independent given (X,Y ), i.e., I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ) = 0. Since we have
I(U1;Z1, Z2|X,Y ) ≤ I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y ) = I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ) (equality follows from (24)), (16) and (17) in
Theorem 2 are now redundant. Thus, the characterization of the rate region does not involve the common randomness
rate R05. Hence, the absence of common randomness does not affect the minimum sum-rate when Z1 and Z2
are conditionally independent given (X,Y ). Now suppose Z1 and Z2 are conditionally dependent given (X,Y ).
In the absence of common randomness, the optimal sum-rate, i.e., RAB−pvtsum (0) is I(X;Z2|Y ) + I(Y ;Z1|X) +
I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ) for the same reasons as above. In the presence of common randomness of rate R0, the sum-rate
can be written as RAB−pvtsum (R0) = I(X;Z2|Y ) + I(Y ;Z1|X) +
[
I(Z1;Z2|X,Y )−R0
]
+
, which is strictly smaller
than RAB−pvtsum (0) for R0 > 0.
B. Privacy required against one user
• When privacy is required against only one user (say, Bob), rmin+1 rounds may strictly improve
the minimum sum-rate, i.e., there exists a function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) such that RB−pvtsum (rmin, R0) >
RB−pvtsum (rmin + 1, R0), for all R0 ≥ 0.
We show this through an example where both users compute a deterministic function of (X,Y ), and privacy
against Bob alone is required.
Example 2. Let Y be an m-length vector of uniform binary random variables, Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym), and X consists
of a uniform binary random variable V and a random variable J which is uniformly distributed on [1 : m], i.e.,
X = (V, J). We assume that Y , V , and J are independent. Both users want to compute the function Z = (J, V ∧YJ),
where “∧” represents the binary AND function, with privacy only against Bob. In this example, it is easy to see that
(see below) rmin is 2 with Bob starting the communication. Note that R
B−pvt
sum (r,R0) does not depend on R0 for a
deterministic function (from Theorem 5) and hence we can write RB−pvtsum (r) for RB−pvtsum (r,R0) by relaxing R0. We
show that the optimum sum-rate for two round protocols, RB−pvtsum (2) is logm+1/2+m bits (all rates in the sequel
are in bits). Then we give a three round protocol, with Alice starting the communication, which has a sum-rate of
RB−pvtsum (3) = logm+ 1/2 + 1. We also show that logm+ 1/2 + 1 is the minimum achievable sum-rate with any
r (r ≥ 3) rounds of protocol. Suppose there exists a two round protocol with Alice starting the communication. If
Bob is able to compute the function with a single message from Alice, then [4, Theorem 1] gives that R12 should
be greater than or equal to the conditional graph entropy of the confusability graph [4]. For this example, it can
be easily verified that R12 ≥ logm + 1 which is strictly greater than the cut-set bound logm + 1/2. This shows
that secure computation is not possible with a two round protocol with Alice starting the communication (because
a statement similar to Theorem 3 holds when privacy is required only against Bob with r = 2 rounds).
Now let us consider a two round protocol with Bob starting the communication. From Theorem 5, there exists
random variables U1, U2 satisfying
U1 − Y −X, (28)
U2 − (U1, X)− Y, (29)
(U1, U2)− (Y,Z)−X, (30)
H(Z|U1, U2, Y ) = 0, (31)
H(Z|U1, U2, X) = 0, (32)
such that R12 ≥ I(Y ;U[1:2]|X) = I(Y ;U1|X) and R21 ≥ I(X;Z|Y ) = H(Z|Y ). We show that U1 must be
such that H(Y |U1) = 0. Suppose not, i.e., H(Y |U1) > 0. Then there exists u1, y and y′, where y 6= y′ such that
p(y, u1) > 0 and p(y′, u1) > 0. Let i ∈ [1 : m] be an index such that yi 6= y′i. Since U1 − Y −X , we have
P (J = i, V = 1, Y = y, U1 = u1) > 0, (33)
P (J = i, V = 1, Y = y′, U1 = u1) > 0. (34)
5We also note that, for R0 = 0, the proof of achievability can be carried out assuming there is no common randomness (not just that its
rate is zero).
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Since U2 − (U1, X)− Y , (33) and (34) imply that there exists u2 such that
P (J = i, V = 1, Y = y, U1 = u1, U2 = u2) > 0, (35)
P (J = i, V = 1, Y = y′, U1 = u1, U2 = u2) > 0. (36)
For (J = i, V = 1, Y = y), Z = (i, yi) := z, whereas for (J = i, V = 1, Y = y′), Z = (i, y′i) := z
′. Note that
z 6= z′. Since Z is a deterministic function of (U1, U2, X) (this follows from (32)), (35) and (36) above imply that
P (J = i, V = 1, Y = y, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, Z = z˜) > 0,
P (J = i, V = 1, Y = y′, U1 = u1, U2 = u2, Z = z˜) > 0,
for some z˜. This is a contradiction. Hence, H(Y |U1) = 0 for any choice of U1 and
I(Y ;U1|X) = H(Y |X)−H(Y |X,U1)
≥ H(Y |X)−H(Y |U1)
= H(Y |X)
= H(Y )
= m.
Therefore, to preserve decodability and privacy, the minimum possible R12 is m which also shows that the function
is not computable in 1 round with Alice starting the communication. Rate R21 is lower bounded by H(Z|Y ), the
cut-set bound, which is equal to logm + 1/2. So the sum-rate is lower bounded by logm + 1/2 + m. This can
be achieved by first Bob communicating U1 = Y to Alice, and Alice computing Z and communicating U2 = Z
to Bob. It is easy to see that this does not violate any privacy requirements. Thus, the optimum sum-rate for two
round protocols is RB−pvtsum (2) = I(X;Z|Y ) + I(Y ;U[1:2]|X) = logm+ 1/2 +m.
Now let us consider a three round protocol. Alice starts the communication by sending U1 = J . Then Bob
communicates U2 = YJ to Alice and in the third round Alice communicates U3 = V ∧ YJ to Bob. The sum-rate
of this protocol is I(X;Z|Y ) + I(Y ;U[1:3]|X) = logm+ 1/2 + 1 which is strictly less than the optimum sum-rate
for two round protocols. In Appendix C, we show that logm+ 1/2 + 1 is the optimum sum-rate for any r round
protocol with r ≥ 3.
• Only one user computes and privacy is required against the other user: interaction and common
randomness do not help to enlarge the rate region.
Let us consider the case where only Bob computes (i.e., Z1 = ∅) and privacy against Alice is required. Note that
every function (qXY , qZ2|XY ) is securely computable in one round with privacy only against Alice
6 since Alice
may send X to Bob, and Bob, having Y as his input, may output Z2 according to qZ2|XY . By substituting Z1 = ∅
in Theorem 4, it can be observed that the only active constraint is R12 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ). Further, let us consider
R∗12 = min I(X;U[1:r]|Y ), where the minimization is over conditional p.m.f.’s p(u[1:r]|x, y, z2) satisfying (5)-(6),
and
U[1:r] −X − (Y,Z2), (37)
Z2 − (U[1:r], Y )−X. (38)
Now let us consider R′12 = min I(X;U[1:r]|Y ), where the minimization is only under (37) and (38). Then R∗12 ≥
R′12. Further, it can be observed that R′12 is the minimum rate achievable when r = 1. So R∗12 ≤ R′12. This shows
that the rate region is given by
{(R0, R12), R21 : R0 ≥ 0, R12 ≥ I(X;U |Y ), R21 ≥ 0},
for some conditional p.m.f. p(u|x, y, z2) satisfying U−X−(Y, Z2) and Z2−(U, Y )−X . This shows that interaction
and the presence of common randomness do not help in this case.
6Note that for a deterministic function, one-sided communication implies that privacy against Alice trivially holds because conditioned on
the inputs, there is only one possible output. However, for a randomized function, one-sided communication need not imply privacy against
Alice, because conditioned on the inputs, the message that Alice sends to Bob can influence the output. But privacy against Alice requires
that, conditioned on the inputs, Alice’s message must not influence Bob’s output.
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y1 y2
0 e 1 0 e 1
x1 0 1 0 1− p p 0
x2 0 1 0 -
x3 - 0 p 1− p
Fig. 2: The randomized function qZ|XY described by the above matrix has ternary X and Z alphabets and binary Y
alphabet. Specifically, X = {x1, x2, x3}, Y = {y1, y2}, and Z = {0, e, 1}, where e denotes the erasure symbol. The
input distribution is as follows: qXY (x2, y2) = qXY (x3, y1) = 0 and qXY (x1, y1) = qXY (x1, y2) = qXY (x2, y1) =
qXY (x3, y2) = 1/4. When Bob’s input is y1, the output is always an erasure. When Bob’s input is y2, the
randomized function qZ|X,Y=y2 behaves as an erasure channel with binary input in {x1, x3} and parameter p ∈ [0, 1]:
qZ|XY (0|x1, y2) = qZ|XY (1|x3, y2) = 1− p and qZ|XY (e|x1, y2) = qZ|XY (e|x3, y2) = p.
V. THE COMMUNICATION COST OF SECURITY - AN EXAMPLE
Recall that Theorem 3 states that if a function is securely computable with privacy against both users, then cut-
set lower bounds (for function computation without any privacy) are achievable, i.e., when a function is securely
computable with privacy against both users, there is no communication cost of security. In this section, we study
the communication cost of security when privacy is required against only one user and compare it with the
communication cost of non-private computation. It turns out that, for a function which is securely computable
with privacy against only one user, the requirement of privacy, in general, may lead to a larger optimal rate. We
consider, arguably, the simplest special case of two-user secure computation where only Bob computes a function
using a single round of transmission from Alice. We also compare our results with the function computation without
any privacy requirement. For the sake of comparison, below we state a result from [6], specialized to our setting
(i.e., one-way communication from Alice to Bob and only Bob computing), for the optimal rate required when
there is no privacy requirement. We denote the optimal rate by RNo-Privacy when there is no common randomness.
Note that [6] considered a more general model (where Alice and Bob communicate back and forth for multiple
rounds, and both of them may produce potentially different outputs), and obtained a single-letter expression for the
optimal rate, when Alice and Bob interact for arbitrary but finite number of rounds.
Theorem 6. [6, Theorem 1] For any (qXY , qZ|XY ),
RNo-privacy = min
pU|XYZ :
U−X−Y
Z−(U,Y )−X
I(X,Z;U |Y ),
where cardinality of U satisfies |U| ≤ |X | · |Y| · |Z|+ 2.
We define RAB−pvt, RA−pvt and RB−pvt as the infima of all the achievable rates in the absence of common
randomness when privacy is required, respectively, against both users, only against Alice, and only against Bob.
Theorems 2, 4 and 5 give us expressions for RAB−pvt, RA−pvt and RB−pvt, respectively. Before we discuss the
example, we present an alternative expression for RA−pvt in terms of conditional graph entropy [4], HG(X|Y ) (see
Definition 6 in Section VI-A) which simplifies the computation.
Proposition 1. Suppose (qXY , qZ|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy only against Alice, then
RA−pvt = HG(X|Y ).
Proposition 1 is proved in Appendix D.
Example 3. Consider the randomized function (qXY , qZ|XY ) given in Figure 2. If p = 1, Alice does not need
to send any message, and the rate required is zero in all the four cases. So, we consider p < 1, and analyze the
randomized function under all the four cases of privacy (including no privacy) below.
a) Privacy against both users: It can be shown from Lemma 4 (Appendix E) that the randomized function
(qXY , qZ|XY ) is securely computable with privacy against both users if and only if p = 0 or p = 1. As noted
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RB−pvt :
RA−pvt :
RNo-privacy :
cut-set bound :
Fig. 3: The cut-set bound (dotted violet curve on the bottom), i.e., I(X;Z|Y ) = 1−p2 intersects the blue curve
of no privacy case (RNo-privacy denotes the optimal rate) at p = 0, 1, where the randomized function of Figure 2
can be securely computable with privacy against both users (RAB−pvt denotes the optimal rate). For p = 0,
RAB−pvt = 1/2, for p = 1, RAB−pvt = 0. This is, in fact, consistent with Theorem 3, which states that if a function
is securely computable with privacy against both users, then cut-set lower bound (for function computation without
any privacy) is achievable. In contrast, when the function is securely computable with privacy against only one user,
the requirement of privacy, in general, may lead to a larger optimal rate. The red curve on the top is for privacy
only against Bob (RB−pvt denotes the optimal rate). The olive green dashed curve is for privacy only against Alice
(RA−pvt denotes the optimal rate); this curve does not depend on the value of p for 0 ≤ p < 1, because RA−pvt
is equal to the conditional graph entropy, which depends only on the input distribution for 0 ≤ p < 1. For p = 1,
RA−pvt = 0.
earlier, if p = 1, the rate required is zero, i.e., RAB−pvt = 0. If p = 0, then RAB−pvt = I(X;Z|Y ) = 1/2.
b) Privacy only against Alice: By Proposition 1, the optimum rate is RA−pvt = HG(X|Y ). The char-
acteristic graph (see Section VI-A) corresponding to the randomized function (qXY , qZ|XY ) is G = (V, E),
where V = {x1, x2, x3} and E = {{x1, x3}}, i.e., G has a single edge between x1 and x3. The optimal rate
RA−pvt is equal to the conditional graph entropy HG(X|Y ) of this graph G. Note that there are two maxi-
mal independent sets {x1, x2} and {x2, x3} in G. It can be shown easily that I(W ;X|Y ) is minimized when
pW |X({x1, x2}|x1) = pW |X({x1, x2}|x2) = 1, pW |X({x2, x3}|x3) = 1. This yields I(W ;X|Y ) = 1/2, which
implies that HG(X|Y ) = 1/2. We obtain RA−pvt = 1/2 for 0 ≤ p < 1. (When p = 1, the graph G does not have
any edge, and the rate required is zero, i.e., RA−pvt = 0.)
c) Privacy only against Bob: From Theorem 5, the optimal rate for asymptotically securely computing
(qXY , qZ|XY ) with privacy against Bob is equal to
RB−pvt = min
pU|XYZ :
U−X−Y
Z−(U,Y )−X
U−(Y,Z)−X
I(X,Z;U |Y )
= min
pU|XYZ :
U−X−Y
Z−(U,Y )−X
U−(Y,Z)−X
I(Z;U |Y ) (39)
First we show that this randomized function is securely computable with privacy against Bob, i.e., we give a random
variable U that satisfies the Markov chains in (39). For that we give an encoder-decoder pair (pU |X , pZ|UY ) that
perfectly securely computes (qXY , qZ|XY ) with privacy against Bob. The random variable U has ternary alphabet
U = {u1, u2, u3}. The encoder-decoder pair (pU |X , pZ|UY ) is defined as follows:
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pU |X(u1|x) = 1− p for x = x1, x2; pZ|UY (e|u, y1) = 1 for u = u1, u2;
pU |X(u2|x) = p for x = x1, x2; pZ|UY (0|u1, y2) = 1;
pU |X(u2|x3) = p; pZ|UY (e|u2, y2) = 1;
pU |X(u3|x3) = 1− p; pZ|UY (1|u3, y2) = 1.
(40)
It can be verified that the above encoder-decoder pair (pU |X , pZ|UY ) satisfies perfect privacy against Bob (i.e., it
satisfies the Markov chain U − (Y,Z)−X) and perfect correctness (i.e., pZ|X=x,Y=y = qZ|X=x,Y=y for every x, y
such that qXY (x, y) > 0). We will now show that the choice of auxiliary random variable in (40) is optimal for the
optimization problem in (39). Consider any pU |XY Z which satisfies the constraints in (39). Note that when Y = y1,
Z = e with probability 1. This implies that I(Z;U |Y = y1) = 0, which simplifies the rate-expression for RB−pvt
to the following:
RB−pvt = min
pU|XYZ :
U−X−Y
Z−(U,Y )−X
U−(Y,Z)−X
1
2
I(Z;U |Y = y2). (41)
To evaluate the expression in (41), it is sufficient to take minimization over encoder-decoder pairs (pU |X , pZ|U,Y=y2)
that perfectly securely compute (qX|Y=y2 , qZ|X,Y=y2) with privacy against Bob. Consider such an encoder-decoder
pair (pU |X , pZ|U,Y=y2). Let (z1, z2, z3) = (0, e, 1). For i ∈ [1 : 3], define Ui := {u ∈ U : pZ|U,Y=y2(zi|u) > 0}. It
follows from Claim 2 that U1 ∩ U2 ∩ U3 = φ 7. This means that when Bob has y2 as his input, then U determines
Z, i.e., H(Z|U, Y = y2) = 0, which implies RB−pvt = 12I(Z;U |Y = y2) = 12H(Z|Y = y2) = 12(h(p) + (1− p)).
Thus, any encoder-decoder pair (pU |X , pZ|UY ) that perfectly securely computes the randomized function of Figure 2
achieves the same value for I(Z;U |Y ). In particular, the pair defined in (40) also achieves the optimal rate in (41),
which is equal to 12(h(p) + (1− p)), for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
d) No privacy: From Theorem 6, the optimal rate is equal to
RNo-privacy = min
pU|XYZ :
U−X−Y
Z−(U,Y )−X
I(X,Z;U |Y ). (42)
Note that minimization in the above expression is over all encoder-decoder pairs (pU |X , pZ|UY ) such that they
induce the correct qZ|XY (.|x, y) for every x ∈ X , y ∈ Y for which qXY (x, y) > 0. Note that when Y = y1, Z = e
with probability 1. Now, for any (pU |X , pZ|UY ), define another encoder-decoder pair (qU |X , qZ|UY ) as follows:
qU |X(u|x) :=
{
pU |X(u|x1) if x = x1, x2,
pU |X(u|x3) if x = x3.
qZ|UY (z|u, y) :=
{
1{z=e} if y = y1,
pZ|UY (z|u, y2) if y = y2.
(43)
It can be verified that (qU |X , qZ|UY ) is a valid encoder-decoder pair that correctly computes the randomized
function of Figure 2. Observe that I(X,Z;U |Y = y1)|qUXZ|Y=y1 = 0 and I(X,Z;U |Y = y2)|qUXZ|Y=y2 =
I(X,Z;U |Y = y2)|pUXZ|Y=y2 . This implies that I(X,Z;U |Y )qUXYZ ≤ I(X,Z;U |Y )pUXYZ , which further implies
that the expression for RNo-Privacy from (42) reduces to the following:
RNo-privacy = min
pU|XYZ :
U−X−Y
Z−(U,Y )−X
1
2
I(X,Z;U |Y = y2). (44)
To evaluate the expression in (44), it is sufficient to take minimization over encoder-decoder pairs (pU |X , pZ|U,Y=y2)
7When we restrict Bob’s input to y2, then Alice’s input X takes values in {x1, x3}. For securely computing (qX|Y=y2 , qZ|X,Y=y2) with
p ∈ (0, 1), we have k = 3 and ~α(y2)1 = (1, 0), ~α(y2)2 = (1/2, 1/2), ~α(y2)3 = (0, 1). For p = 0 we have k = 2 and ~α(y2)1 = (1, 0),
~
α
(y2)
2 = (0, 1). For definitions of k and ~α
(y)’s, see discussion on page 19.
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Fig. 4: This figure is for Y = y2. The pUXZ|Y=y2 which minimizes the rate-expression in (44) is a concatenation
of two symmetric erasure channels – the first channel has parameter p1, the second channel has parameter p2, and
p1, p2 satisfies the constraint that (1− p1)(1− p2) = 1− p.
that compute (qX|Y=y2 , qZ|X,Y=y2) with perfect correctness. We will argue that the (pU |X , pZ|U,Y=y2) shown in
Figure 4 includes a minimizer for (44). It is a concatenation of two symmetric erasure channels – first erasure
channel is with parameter p1 ∈ [0, 1] and the second erasure channel is with parameter p2 ∈ [0, 1] – with the
constraint that (1 − p1)(1 − p2) = 1 − p. The reason that this choice of encoder-decoder pair (which is given in
Figure 4) is optimal for our problem is given next:
The minimization in (44) is related to Wyner’s common information problem [28], where Alice gets an input
sequence Xn and Bob wants to generate an output sequence Zn such that (Xn, Zn) is close to the desired (Xn, Zn)
in `1-distance, where (Xi, Zi)’s are i.i.d. according to a given qXZ . The minimum rate required for this problem
is equal to the Wyner’s common information, which is defined as minpU|XZ I(X,Z;U), where minimization is
taken over all pU |XZ such that X − U − Z is a Markov chain. The pU |XZ that satisfies X − U − Z and achieves
the least value for I(X,Z;U) was obtained by Cuff [29, Section II-F] and is presented in Figure 4 (without Y ).
The expression that we want to compute is minpU|X,Y=y2,Z I(X,Z;U |Y = y2), where minimization is taken over
all pU |X,Y=y2,Z such that X − U − Z is a Markov chain. Note that we are also computing the Wyner common
information for the joint distribution over X × Z given by the conditional distribution qXZ|Y=y2 . So, the same
encoder-decoder pair (pU |X , pZ|U,Y=y2) from Figure 4 also minimizes the rate expression in (44).
With this (pU |X , pZ|U,Y=y2), the objective function in (44) becomes I(X,Z;U |Y = y2) = 12 [h(p) + (1−p1)(1−
h(p2))]. Note that the (pU |X , pZ|U,Y=y2) from Figure 4 has two parameters p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1], which must satisfy the
constraint (1 − p1)(1 − p2) = 1 − p. Hence, the minimization in (44) can be taken over all p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1] which
satisfy (1 − p1)(1 − p2) = 1 − p. The simplified rate expression for RNo-privacy is given below (for all values of
p ∈ [0, 1]):
RNo-privacy = min
p1,p2∈[0,1]:
(1−p1)(1−p2)=1−p
1
2
[h(p) + (1− p1)(1− h(p2))]. (45)
Comparison: For convenience, we write the optimal rate expressions for asymptotic security in all the four privacy
settings, and plot these in Figure 3.
RAB−pvt =
{
1/2 at p = 0,
0 at p = 1;
RA−pvt =
{
1/2 for 0 ≤ p < 1,
0 at p = 1;
RB−pvt =
1
2
(h(p) + (1− p)) for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1;
RNo-privacy = min
p1,p2∈[0,1]:
(1−p1)(1−p2)=1−p
1
2
[h(p) + (1− p1)(1− h(p2))] for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
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VI. PERFECT SECURITY: ONE ROUND OF COMMUNICATION; ONLY BOB COMPUTES
We discuss perfect security setting for the simple special case in this last section, i.e., only Bob produces an
output and there is a single round of transmission from Alice. Upper and lower bounds on the optimal expected
length of transmission are obtained.
A. Preliminaries
Most of our results in this section are stated in terms of various information theoretic quantities that are defined
on graphs which arise from randomized function computation. For a given (qXY , qZ|XY ), we define the following
characteristic graph G = (X , E), where
E = {{x, x′} : ∃(y, z) s.t. qXY (x, y) > 0, qXY (x′, y) > 0 and qZ|XY (z|x, y) 6= qZ|XY (z|x′, y)}.
There is a probability distribution qX on the vertices of G. The intuition behind this definition of a graph comes
from the randomized function computation, where Alice and Bob have inputs X and Y , respectively, and Bob
wants to produce a randomized function qZ|XY of these inputs. Suppose x, x′ ∈ X , y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z are such that
qXY (x, y) > 0, qXY (x
′, y) > 0 and qZ|XY (z|x, y) 6= qZ|XY (z|x′, y). Observe that Alice cannot send the same
message if her input is x or x′: because if she does so, and Bob happens to have y as his input (which happens
with positive probability), then there is no way Bob can produce an output with correct distribution. This means
that Alice has to distinguish through the message whether her input is x or x′. This distinction is achieved by
defining a graph on X and putting an edge between x and x′. An edge {x′, x′} means that Alice cannot send the
same message if her input is x or x′. Per contra, if {x, x′} /∈ E , then Alice does not need to distinguish between
x and x′, because, if qXY (x, y) > 0, qXY (x′, y) > 0 for some y ∈ Y , then qZ|XY (z|x, y) = qZ|XY (z|x′, y) holds
for every z ∈ Z . So, if {x, x′} /∈ E , then x and x′ are equivalent from the function computation point of view.
We say that a coloring c : X → {0, 1}∗ of the vertices of G is proper, if both the vertices of any edge {x, x′}
have distinct colors, i.e., c(x) 6= c(x′). Note that c(X) is a random variable with entropy
H(c(X)) =
∑
γ ∈ image(c)
qX(c
−1(γ)) log2
1
qX(c−1(γ))
,
where image(c) is the image of the function c, c−1 is the inverse of c, and qX(c−1(γ)) for a color γ is defined as
qX(c
−1(γ)) :=
∑
x∈X :c(x)=γ qX(x). Note that the function c partitions X into color classes, i.e., the set of vertices
assigned the same color, and H(c(X)) is the entropy of this partition. The chromatic entropy Hχ(G, X) of G is
defined as the lowest entropy of such a partition produced by any proper coloring of G:
Definition 5 (Chromatic Entropy, [30]). For a given (qXY , qZ|XY ), the chromatic entropy of G is defined as
Hχ(G, X) := min{H(c(X)) : c is a proper coloring of G},
where c(X) denotes the induced distribution on colors by the coloring c.
An independent set of G is a collection U ⊆ X of vertices such that no two vertices of U are connected by an
edge in G. Let W denote the random variable corresponding to the independent sets in G, and let Γ (G) be the set
of all independent sets in G.
Definition 6 (Conditional Graph Entropy, [4]). For a given (qXY , qZ|XY ), the conditional graph entropy of G is
defined as
HG(X|Y ) := minpW |X :
W−X−Y
X∈W∈Γ (G)
I(W ;X|Y ),
where minimum is taken over all the conditional distributions pW |X such that pW |X(w|x) > 0 only if x ∈ w.
By the data-processing inequality, this minimization can be restricted to W ’s ranging over maximal independent
sets of G [4]. Note that 0 ≤ HG(X|Y ) ≤ H(X|Y ) hold in general, and if G is a complete graph then HG(X|Y ) =
H(X|Y ).
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Fig. 5: Perfectly secure computation
B. Perfect Security
As shown in Figure 5, Alice and Bob get X and Y , respectively, as their inputs, where (X,Y ) is distributed
according to qXY ; Alice sends a message M to Bob, and based on (M,Y ), Bob produces Z as the output, which
is required to be distributed according to qZ|XY while preserving privacy. We allow variable length codes. Any
scheme for computing (qXY , qZ|XY ) is defined as a pair of stochastic maps (pU |X , pZ|UY ), where U takes values in
{0, 1}∗ such that all the binary strings in the support set of U are prefix-free. We call pU |X the encoder and pZ|UY
the decoder. Let L(U) denote the random variable corresponding to the length of U in bits and the expected length
E[L(U)] denote the rate of code. In this section, we give bounds on the optimal rate of communication for the
three cases of privacy, i.e., privacy against both users, privacy only against Alice and privacy only against Bob. In
this section, we will only consider the case when there is no common randomness available to the users. However,
we show below in Lemma 1 that this is without loss of generality whenever privacy against Alice is required (i.e.,
when privacy is required against both Alice and Bob or only against Alice). When privacy is required only against
Bob, we show through an example (Example 4) later in this section that common randomness helps to improve
the rate of communication.
Lemma 1. When privacy against Alice is required (i.e., when privacy is required against both users or when
privacy is required only against Alice), common randomness does not help to improve the optimal rate.
Proof: Let (pU |XW , pZ|WUY ) be an encoder-decoder pair (note that this pair takes in to account the common
randomness also in addition to the definition of encoder-decoder pair mentioned in the paragraph above this lemma)
that securely computes (qXY , qZ|XY ). Consider the probability distribution,
p(w, x, y, z) = p(x, y, z)p(w|x, y, z) (46)
= p(x, y, z)p(w|x) (47)
= p(x, y, z)p(w), (48)
where (47) follows from privacy against Alice, i.e., (U,W )− X − (Y,Z), (48) follows from the independence of
random variables W and X . Thus we have,
p(w, x, y, z) = p(w)p(x, y, z). (49)
Now, consider the expected length,
E [L(U)] = E [E [L(U)|W ]] (50)
=
∑
w
p(w)E [L(U)|W = w] . (51)
This implies that there exists w∗ such that E [L(U)|W = w∗] ≤ E[L(U)], i.e., there exists a p.m.f. p(u, x, y, z|w∗)
achieving the same or smaller expected length and satisfying the required Markov chains. Note that (49) makes
sure that correctness condition holds.
Privacy required against both users: We need some definitions first.
Definition 7. For any x, x′ ∈ X , we say that x ∼ x′, if there exists y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z such that qXY (x, y) >
0, qXY (x
′, y) > 0 and qZ|XY (z|x, y) > 0, qZ|XY (z|x′, y) > 0.
Definition 8. For any two distinct elements x, x′ of X , we say that x ≡ x′, if there exists a sequence x =
x1, x2, . . . , xl−1, xl = x′ for some integer l, where xi ∼ xi+1 for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l − 1}.
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It can be verified easily that the above defined relation ≡ is an equivalence relation. We know that an equivalence
relation partitions the whole space into equivalence classes. Suppose the relation ≡ partitions the space X as
X = X1
⊎X2⊎ . . .⊎Xk, where each Xi is an equivalence class, k is the number of equivalence classes, and ⊎
stands for disjoint union.
Let XEQ := {x1, x2, . . . , xk}, where xi is the representative of the equivalence class Xi. Now, we define
(qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ) as follows:
• Define qXEQY (xi, y) :=
∑
x∈Xi qXY (x, y) for every (xi, y) ∈ (XEQ × Y).
• For (xi, y) ∈ (XEQ × Y), if there exists x ∈ Xi s.t. qXY (x, y) > 0, then define qZ|XEQY (z|xi, y) :=
qZ|XY (z|x, y), for every z ∈ Z . If there exists no x ∈ Xi s.t. qXY (x, y) > 0, then it does not matter
what the conditional distribution qZ|XEQY (z|xi, y) is; in particular, we can define qZ|XEQY (.|xi, y) to be the
uniform distribution in {1, 2, . . . , |Z|}.
Lemma 2. Suppose (qXY , qZ|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against both users, and let
(qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ) be the reduced problem defined as above. For every encoder-decoder pair (pU |X , pZ|UY ) that
securely computes (qXY , qZ|XY ), there is another encoder-decoder pair (pU˜ |XEQ , pZ|U˜Y ) that securely computes
(pXEQY , pZ|XEQY ), and vice-versa. Furthermore, L(U) and L(U˜) have the same p.m.f., where L(U) and L(U˜)
denote the random variables corresponding to the lengths of U and U˜ (in bits), respectively.
It follows from Lemma 2 proved in Appendix E that, to study the communication complexity of secure com-
putation of (qXY , qZ|XY ), it is enough to study the communication complexity of secure computation of the
reduced problem (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ). To give a rate-optimal code for (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ), we define the following
graph GEQ = (VEQ, EEQ):
• VEQ = XEQ = {x1, x2, . . . , xk},
• EEQ = {{xi, xj} : there exists (y, z) such that qXEQY (xi, y) > 0, qXEQY (xj , y) > 0 and qZ|XEQY (z|xi, y) 6=
qZ|XEQY (z|xj , y)}.
We say that a coloring c : V → {0, 1}∗ of the vertices of a graph G = (V, E) is proper, if both the vertices of any
edge {u, v} have distinct colors, i.e., c(u) 6= c(v).
Claim 1. Every proper coloring of the vertices of GEQ corresponds to a secure code for (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ), and
every secure code for (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ) corresponds to a collection of proper colorings of the vertices of GEQ.
The above claim is proved in Appendix F.
Now we are ready to prove upper and lower bounds on optimal expected length of the message, which is defined
as L∗AB−pvt := min(pU|X ,pZ|UY ) E[L(U)], where L(U) denotes the random variable corresponding to the length of
U in bits, and minimization is taken over all (pU |X , pZ|UY ) that perfectly securely computes (qXY , qZ|XY ) with
privacy against both users.
Theorem 7. Suppose (qXY , qZ|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against both users. Then
Hχ(GEQ, XEQ) ≤ L∗AB−pvt < Hχ(GEQ, XEQ) + 1,
where chromatic entropy Hχ(., .) is defined in Definition 5.
Proof: Upper bound: Claim 1 implies that an optimal coloring of GEQ corresponds to a secure code for
(qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ). Now, since expected length of any optimal prefix-free binary encoding of a random variable V
is upper-bounded by H(V )+1 [31, Theorem 5.4.1], we have that the optimal expected length of the message from
Alice to Bob is upper-bounded by Hχ(GEQ, XEQ) + 1.
Lower bound: By Claim 1, every secure (randomized) code also corresponds to proper (random) colorings (c~r)~r
of the graph G. Note that the expected length L(c~r) of any coloring c~r is lower-bounded by H(c~r(X)), which
follows from the fact that the expected length of any prefix-free binary code for a random variable V is lower-
bounded by H(V ) [31, Theorem 5.4.1]. Now, since entropy of any coloring is lower-bounded by Hχ(GEQ, XEQ),
entropy of the optimal coloring, it follows that E~r[L(c~r)] ≥ Hχ(GEQ, XEQ). So the expected length of the message
is also lower-bounded by Hχ(GEQ, XEQ).
Multiple Instances. Alice and Bob have Xn and Y n as their inputs, respectively, where (Xi, Yi) ∼ qXY , i.i.d., and
Bob wants to compute Zn, which should be distributed according to qZn|XnY n(zn|xn, yn) =
∏n
i=1 qpZ|XY (zi|xi, yi).
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Computation should be such that no user learns any additional information about other user’s data other than what
can be inferred from their own data. It is easy to see that (qXnY n , qZn|XnY n) is perfectly securely computable
with privacy against both users if and only if (qXY , qZ|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against
both users. We can define the graph GnEQ = (X nEQ, EnEQ) by extending the definition of GEQ in a straightforward
manner: X nEQ is the n-fold cartesian product of XEQ, and EnEQ = {{xn, x′n} ∈ X nEQ × X nEQ : ∃(yn, zn) ∈ Yn ×
Zn s.t. pXnEQY n(xn, yn) > 0, pXnEQY n(x′n, yn) > 0 and pZn|XnEQY n(zn|xn, yn) 6= pZn|XnEQY n(zn|x′n, yn)}. Note that
we slightly abused the notation: X nEQ is defined to be the n-fold cartesian product of XEQ, but EnEQ is not the n-fold
cartesian product of EEQ.
We define, analogous to the single instance case, L∗AB−pvt−n to be the optimal amortized expected length of the
message that Alice sends to Bob in this setting. The following is a simple corollary of Theorem 7.
Corollary 2. Suppose (qXY , qZ|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against both users. Then
1
n
Hχ(GnEQ, XnEQ) ≤ L∗AB−pvt−n <
1
n
(Hχ(GnEQ, XnEQ) + 1).
Observe that GnEQ is neither the AND-product nor the OR-product of the graph GEQ; and as far as we know, no
single letter expression of 1nHχ(GnEQ, XnEQ) (not even of limn→∞ 1nHχ(GnEQ, XnEQ)) is known. See [30] for definitions
of AND-product and OR-product of graphs.
Privacy required only against Alice: Note that every (qXY , qZ|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy
against Alice, since Alice may send X to Bob, and Bob, having Y as his input, may output Z according to qZ|XY .
For a given (qXY , qZ|XY ), we define the following characteristic graph G = (X , E), where the edge set is defined
as follows:
E = {{x, x′} : ∃(y, z) s.t. qXY (x, y) > 0, qXY (x′, y) > 0 and qZ|XY (z|x, y) 6= qZ|XY (z|x′, y)}. (52)
We define optimal expected length of the message, which is defined as L∗A−pvt := min(pU|X ,pZ|UY ) E[L(U)], where
L(U) denotes the random variable corresponding to the length of U in bits, and minimization is taken over all
(pU |X , pZ|UY ) that perfectly securely computes (qXY , qZ|XY ) with privacy against Alice. Then, the following upper
and lower bounds hold.
Theorem 8. For any (qXY , qZ|XY ),
Hχ(G, X) ≤ L∗A−pvt < Hχ(G, X) + 1,
where chromatic entropy Hχ(., .) is defined in Definition 5.
Proof: We first show that every proper coloring of the vertices of G corresponds to a perfectly secure code for
(qXY , qZ|XY ) with privacy against Alice, and every perfectly secure code for (qXY , qZ|XY ) with privacy against
Alice corresponds to a collection of proper colorings of the vertices of G. This can be proved along the lines of the
proof of Claim 1. Note that Claim 1 is for privacy against both users, but we did not use privacy against Bob in
proving that – because Claim 1 is for (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ), and when we transform our problem from (qXY , qZ|XY )
to (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ), privacy against Bob becomes redundant. Now, Theorem 8 can be proved along the lines of
the proof of Theorem 7.
Multiple Instances. The setting is analogous to the multiple instances setting described before, except that we do
not require privacy against Bob. Note that we want to securely compute (qXnY n , qZn|XnY n) with privacy against
Alice, where (Xi, Yi)’s are i.i.d. according to qXY and qZn|XnY n is in product form, i.e., qZn|XnY n(zn|xn, yn) =∏n
i=1 qZ|XY (zi|xi, yi). Similar to the way we defined GnEQ, we can define the graph Gn = (X n, En) by extending
the definition of G analogously: En = {{xn, x′n} ∈ X n × X n : ∃(yn, zn) ∈ Yn × Zn s.t. qXnY n(xn, yn) >
0, qXnY n(x
′n, yn) > 0 and qZn|XnY n(zn|xn, yn) 6= qZn|XnY n(zn|x′n, yn)}. We define, analogous to the single
instance case, L∗A−pvt−n to be the optimal amortized expected length of the message that Alice sends to Bob in
this setting. The following is a simple corollary of Theorem 8.
Corollary 3. Suppose (qXY , qZ|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against both users. Then
1
n
Hχ(Gn, Xn) ≤ L∗A−pvt−n <
1
n
(Hχ(Gn, Xn) + 1).
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Observe that Gn is neither the AND-product nor the OR-product of the graph GEQ; and as far as we know, no
single letter expression of 1nHχ(GnEQ, XnEQ) (not even of limn→∞ 1nHχ(GnEQ, XnEQ)) is known.
Privacy required only against Bob: First we explicitly characterize (qXY , qZ|XY ) that are perfectly securely
computable with privacy against Bob, where qXY has full support. None of the proofs in this section depends
on the specific distribution of qXY as long as it has full support. So the characterization remains the same for all
qXY that have full support.
For every y ∈ Y , define a set Z(y) = {z ∈ Z : ∃x ∈ X s.t. qZ|XY (z|x, y) > 0}. Essentially, the set Z(y) discards
all those elements of Z that never appear as an output when Bob’s input is y.
Definition 9. For y ∈ Y , define a relation ≡y on the set Z(y) as follows: for z, z′ ∈ Z(y), we say that z ≡y z′, if
there is a constant c > 0 such that qZ|XY (z|x, y) = c · qZ|XY (z′|x, y) for every x ∈ X .
It is easy to see that ≡y is an equivalence relation for every y ∈ Y , which partitions Z(y) into equivalent classes.
Consider a y ∈ Y , and let Z(y) = Z(y)1
⊎Z(y)2 ⊎ . . .⊎Z(y)k(y), where k(y) is the number of equivalence classes in
the partition generated by ≡y. For every equivalence class Z(y)i in this partition, define a |X | × |Z(y)i | matrix A(y)i
such that A(y)i (x, z) = qZ|XY (z|x, y) for every (x, z) ∈ X × Z(y)i . Note that, for every i ∈ [k(y)], all the columns
of A(y)i are multiples of each other. Since A
(y)
i is a rank-one matrix, we can write it as A
(y)
i = ~α
(y)
i ~γ
(y)
i , where
~α
(y)
i is a column vector (whose entries are non-negative and sum up to one, which makes it a unique probability
vector) and ~γ(y)i is a row vector. Entries of ~α
(y)
i and ~γ
(y)
i are indexed by x ∈ X and z ∈ Z(y)i , respectively. So
A
(y)
i (x, z) = ~α
(y)
i (x)~γ
(y)
i (z). Note that if ~α
(y)
i = ~α
(y)
j , then i = j.
Suppose (qXY , qZ|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against Bob. This implies that there exists
a pair of encoder and decoder (pU |X , pZ|UY ), which induces the joint distribution pXY UZ = qXY pU |XpZ|UY , that
satisfies correctness (i.e., pXY Z = qXY qZ|XY ) and privacy against Bob (i.e., the Markov chain U − (Y, Z) − X
holds). Note that the random variable U corresponds to the message that Alice sends to Bob. We define a set U (y)i
to be the set of all those messages that Alice can send to Bob, and when Bob, having y as his input outputs an
element of Z(y)i , as follows:
U (y)i = {u ∈ U : p(u, z|y) > 0 for some z ∈ Z(y)i }. (53)
Note that for every y ∈ Y and i ∈ [1 : k(y)], the probability vector ~α(y)i corresponds to the equivalence class Z(y)i .
The following claim is proved in Appendix G
Claim 2. Consider any y, y′ ∈ Y and i ∈ [1 : k(y)], j ∈ [1 : k(y′)]. If ~α(y)i 6= ~α(y
′)
j , then U (y)i ∩ U (y
′)
j = φ.
With the help of Claim 2 we can show that for every y, y′ ∈ Y , the corresponding collections of probability
vectors {~α(y)i : i ∈ [1 : k(y)]} and {~α(y
′)
j : j ∈ [1 : k(y′)]} are equal. The following claim is proved in Appendix G.
Claim 3. For all y, y′ ∈ Y , we have the following:
1) k(y) = k(y′).
2) {~α(y)1 , ~α(y)2 , . . . , ~α(y)k } = {~α(y
′)
1 , ~α
(y′)
2 , . . . , ~α
(y′)
k }, where k = k(y) for any y ∈ Y .
For ease of notation, without loss of generality, we rearrange the indices, to have ~α(y
′)
j = ~α
(y)
i if and only if
i = j. Now it follows from Claim 2 and Claim 3 that the message set U and the alphabet Z(y), for every y ∈ Y ,
can be partitioned into k parts as follows:
U = U1 unionmulti U2 unionmulti . . . unionmulti Uk,
Z(y) = Z(y)1 unionmulti Z(y)2 unionmulti . . . unionmulti Z(y)k ,
where Z(y)i = {z ∈ Z(y) : p(u, z|x, y) > 0 for some x ∈ X , u ∈ Ui}. Note that the same Ui is used to define Z(y)i
(and corresponds to ~α(y)i also) for every y ∈ Y . Now we can state the characterization theorem, which is proved
in Appendix H.
Theorem 9. Suppose pXY has full support. Then (qXY , qZ|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy
against Bob if and only if the following holds for every y, y′ ∈ Y:
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1) {~α(y)1 , ~α(y)2 , . . . , ~α(y)k } = {~α(y
′)
1 , ~α
(y′)
2 , . . . , ~α
(y′)
k },
2) For any i ∈ [k], ∑z∈Z(y)i qZ|XY (z|x, y) = ∑z∈Z(y′)i qZ|XY (z|x, y′) for every x ∈ X .
We introduce a new random variable W , which takes values in [k], and is jointly distributed with (X,Y, Z) as
follows: define pXYWZ(x, y, i, z) := 0, if pXY Z(x, y, z) = 0; otherwise, define
pXYWZ(x, y, i, z) := qXY (x, y)× pW |X(i|x)× pZ|WY (z|i, y)
:= qXY (x, y)×
( ∑
z∈Z(y)i
qZ|XY (z|x, y)
)
×
(
1{z∈Z(y)i } ×
qZ|XY (z|x, y)∑
z∈Z(y)i qZ|XY (z|x, y)
)
. (54)
Comments are in order: (i) We defined pW |X(i|x) to be
∑
z∈Z(y)i qZ|XY (z|x, y) in (54) – this is a valid definition
because
∑
z∈Z(y)i pq|XY (z|x, y) is same for all y (see Theorem 9). (ii) We defined pZ|WY (z|i, y) to be 1{z∈Z(y)i }×
qZ|XY (z|x,y)∑
z∈Z(y)
i
qZ|XY (z|x,y) in (54) – this is also a valid definition because the matrix A
(y)
i defined earlier is a rank-one
matrix, and therefore, qZ|XY (z|x˜,y)∑
z∈Z(y)
i
qZ|XY (z|x˜,y) is same for all x˜’s for which qZ|XY (z|x˜, y) > 0. It follows from (54)
that pXYWZ(x, y, i, z) = 1{z∈Z(y)i } × qXY Z(x, y, z). Note that W is a deterministic function of both U as well as
of (Y, Z). Now we are ready to prove upper and lower bounds on optimal expected length of the message, which
is defined as L∗B−pvt := min(pU|X ,pZ|UY ) E[L(U)], where L(U) denotes the random variable corresponding to the
length of U in bits, and minimization is taken over all (pU |X , pZ|UY ) that perfectly securely computes (qXY , qZ|XY )
with privacy only against Bob.
Theorem 10. Suppose (pXY , pZ|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against Bob, where pXY has
full support. Then
H(W ) ≤ L∗B−pvt < H(W ) + 1.
Proof: L∗B−pvt ≥ H(W ): Fix an arbitrary pair of encoder and decoder (pU |X , pZ|UY ) that perfectly securely
computes this (qXY , qZ|XY ) with privacy against Bob, i.e., the induced joint distribution pXY UZ = qXY pU |XpZ|UY
satisfies correctness (i.e., qXY Z = qXY qZ|XY ) and privacy against Bob (i.e., U − (Y, Z)−X is a Markov chain).
Fix a prefix-free encoding of U . Let L denote the random variable corresponding to the length of this prefix-free
encoding of U . We show that E[L] ≥ H(W ).
E[L] =
∑
x∈X
pX(x)E[L|X = x]
=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)
∑
l∈N
l × pL|X(l|x)
=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)
∑
l∈N
l
∑
u∈U :l(u)=l
pU |X(u|x) (55)
=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)
∑
u∈U
l(u)pU |X(u|x)
=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)
k∑
i=1
∑
u∈Ui
l(u)p(u|x)
≥
∑
x∈X
pX(x)
k∑
i=1
∑
u∈Ui
li × p(u|x), where li = min
u∈Ui
l(u)
=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)
k∑
i=1
li
∑
u∈Ui
p(u|x)
=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)
k∑
i=1
li
∑
u∈Ui
p(u|x, y1) (56)
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=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)
k∑
i=1
li
∑
z∈Z(y1)i
pZ|XY (z|x, y1) (57)
=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)
k∑
i=1
li × pW |X(i|x) (58)
=
k∑
i=1
li
∑
x∈X
pX(x)pW |X(i|x)
=
k∑
i=1
li × pW (i)
= E[L′] (59)
≥ H(W ). (60)
(55) holds because l(u) is deterministic function of u. (56) follows from the Markov chain U−X−Y . (57) follows
from the fact that when Bob has y1 as his input, his output Z belongs to Z(y)i if and only if U belongs to Ui. In
(58) we used the equality pW |X(i|x) =
∑
z∈Z(y)i qZ|XY (z|x, y) (see (54)). Since l(u)i∈U ’s are lengths of a valid
prefix-free encoding of U , and li = minu∈Ui l(u) for i ∈ [k], it can be verified that l1, l2, . . . , lk are lengths of a
valid prefix-free encoding of W . The random variable L′ in (59) corresponds to this prefix-free encoding of W ,
where Pr{L′ = li} = pW (i). Inequality (60) follows from the fact that the expected length of any prefix-free binary
code for a random variable W is lower-bounded by H(W ) [31, Theorem 5.4.1]. Since this argument holds for any
prefix-free encoding of U , we have L∗B−pvt ≥ H(W ).
L∗B−pvt < H(W ) + 1: We need to show a pair of encoder and decoder (pU |X , pZ|UY ) that perfectly securely
computes this (qXY , qZ|XY ) with privacy against Bob, i.e., the induced joint distribution pXY UZ = qXY pU |XpZ|UY
satisfies correctness (i.e., pXY Zˆ = qXY qZ|XY ) and privacy against Bob (i.e., U − (Y,Z)−X is a Markov chain).
Note that U = W is a valid choice, where pXYWZ is described in (54). The expected length of an optimal prefix-free
binary code of W is upper-bounded by H(W ) + 1 [31, Theorem 5.4.1], which implies that L∗B−pvt < H(W ) + 1.
We conclude the single instance part of this section by giving an example where common randomness helps to
improve the optimal rate, when privacy is required only against Bob (as mentioned in the beginning of Section VI-B).
Example 4. Let X be an m-length (m > 1) vector of mutually independent and uniform binary random variables,
X = (X1, . . . , Xm) and Y = ∅. Also, let Z = (J,XJ), where J is a random variable uniformly distributed on
[1 : m]. This defines a pair (qXY , qZ|XY ).
First we calculate the lower bound of L∗B−pvt for this example from the discussion about random variable W
above Theorem 10. It follows from (54) that pXYWZ(x, y, i, z) = 1{z∈Z(y)i } × qXY Z(x, y, z). Marginalizing this
over x and using the fact that Y = ∅, we get, pW,Z(i, z) = 1{z∈Zi}qZ(z). From the Definition 9, it is clear that Zi
is a singleton set for every i ∈ [1 : |Z|]. Now, fix an i and marginalize pW,Z(i, z) over z, we get pW (i) = qZ(z),
such that Zi = {z}. Then we have pW (i) = 12m since qZ(z) = 12m for every z. This implies that H(W ) = log 2m.
So, from Theorem 10 we have L∗B−pvt ≥ log 2m > 1. Whereas it turns out that a rate of 1 is achievable when we
use common randomness. To see this, let W be a random variable uniformly distributed on [1 : m]. Alice on seeing
W sends XW to Bob using only 1 bit and Bob outputs (W,XW ) since it already has access to W . It is easy to
see that this protocol satisfies privacy against Bob. Thus, common randomness helps to improve the optimal rate,
when privacy is required only against Bob.
Multiple Instances. The setting is analogous to the multiple instances setting described before, except that we
require privacy against Bob here. We define, analogous to the single instance case, L∗B−pvt−n to be the optimal
amortized expected length of the message that Alice sends to Bob in this setting. We give bounds on L∗B−pvt−n
for the case when pXY has full support; and we leave it open to give a tight bound on L∗B−pvt−n for general input
distribution. The following is a simple corollary of Theorem 10.
Corollary 4. Suppose (qXY , qZ|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against Bob, where qXY has
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full support. Then
H(W ) ≤ L∗B−pvt−n < H(W ) +
1
n
.
C. Discussion
In this section we considered a one-sided communication model, where Alice sends a single message to Bob, and
Bob produces an output. However, some of the results in this section hold for the multiple-round communication
model as well, where Alice and Bob communicate over multiple rounds, and in the end Bob produces an output. In
particular, all the results which require privacy condition against Alice hold in the multiple-round communication
setting. In perfect security settings, the Markov chain U −X − (Y,Z), which is for privacy against Alice, implies
the Markov chain U − X − Y , which in turn implies that the whole transcript generated by a multiple-round
communication protocol can be simulated by Alice conditioned on her input only. This means that one-sided
communication in perfect security setting, where privacy against Alice is required, is without loss of generality.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1, 2 & 3
Notation: We use capital letter to denote a random pmf (see e.g., works [32], [29]), e.g. PX . For any two
sequences of random p.m.f.’s P (n)X and Q
(n)
X on X (n) (where X (n) is arbitrary and can differ from the cartesian
product X n), we write PX(n)
≈ QX(n) if E‖PX(n) −QX(n)‖1 < . For any two sequences of random p.m.f.’s PX(n)
and QX(n) on X (n), we write PX(n) ≈ QX(n) if limn→∞E‖PX(n) −QX(n)‖1 = 0.
We prove Theorem 2 first and then prove Theorems 1 & 3.
Proof of Theorem 2: Achievability: The proof is broadly along the lines of the proof of interactive channel
simulation of Yassaee et al. [6]. We consider two protocols, protocol A and protocol B, where Protocol A corresponds
to the source coding side of the problem and Protocol B corresponds to our original problem (with extra shared
random variables, one for each round). Each of these protocols will induce a p.m.f. on random variables defined
during the protocol. We impose a series of constraints (independence constraints and constraints for the reliability
of SW decoders) as done in [6, Theorem 1] so that these two distributions become almost identical. Once we
find such constraints making protocol A almost identical to protocol B, we investigate the correctness and privacy
properties in addition to eliminating the extra shared randomness. The main difference with the achievability of
channel simulation [6] is from (73)-(74) onwards where the requirement of privacy becomes relevant.
We start from source coding side of the problem by fixing a distribution p(u[1:r], x, y, z[1:2]) satisfying (5)-(10). Let
(Un[1:r], X
n, Y n, Zn[1:2]) be i.i.d. with distribution p(u[1:r], x, y, z[1:2]). Messages Mi, extra shared randomness Fi and
the actual shared randomness w are created as bin indices of Un[1:r] in the following way: random variables F1,M1, w
are three independent bin indices of Un1 . Fi and Mi are two independent bin indices of (U
n
1 , . . . , U
n
i ) for i ∈ [2 : r].
The alphabets of Fi, Mi and w are [1 : 2nRˆi ], [1 : 2nRi ] and [1 : 2nR0 ] respectively. Furthermore, we consider Slepian-
Wolf decoders, for odd i ∈ [1 : r], for reconstructing Uˆni (an estimate of Uni ) from (Un[1:i−1], Fi,Mi, w, Y n) and for
even i ∈ [1 : r], for reconstructing Uˆni from (Un[1:i−1], Fi,Mi, w,Xn). Note that the reliability and independence
constraints would remain exactly the same as that of [6, Theorem 1] which are given by
• Independence constraints:
R0 + Rˆ1 < H(U1|X) (61)
Rˆi < H(Ui|Y, U[1:i−1]), for even i ∈ [2 : r], (62)
Rˆi < H(Ui|X,U[1:i−1]), for odd i ∈ [2 : r], (63)
i∑
t=1
Rˆt < H(U[1:i]|X,Y, Z[1:2]). (64)
• Constraints for the reliability of SW decoders:
R1 +R0 + Rˆ1 ≥ H(U1|Y ), (65)
Ri + Rˆi ≥ H(Ui|X,U[1:i−1]), for even i ∈ [2 : r], (66)
Ri + Rˆi ≥ H(Ui|Y,U[1:i−1]), for odd i ∈ [2 : r]. (67)
Intuitively, one can understand the above constraints in the following way: Using the OSRB theorem [32, Theorem 1]
and noting that U1 − X − Y , the first independence constraint (61) ensures that (F1, w) are nearly uniformly
distributed and mutually independent of (Xn, Y n). Similarly, noting that Ui − (U[1:i−1], X) − Y, if i is odd and
Ui − (U[1:i−1], Y ) − X, if i is even, the independence constraints (62) − (63) ensure that Fi is nearly uniformly
distributed and independent of (Xn, Y n, Un[1:i−1]) for i ∈ [2 : r]. The last independence constraint ensures that F[1:r]
is nearly independent of (Xn, Y n, Zn[1:2]), which helps in eliminating the extra shared randomness. Note that Uˆ
n
1
is reconstructed from F1,M1, w and Y n, where F1,M1 and w are the random bin indices of Un1 created by Alice,
and Bob requires a rate of H(U1|Y ) from Alice to recover Un1 . This corresponds to the first SW constraint (65).
The other SW constraints (66)− (67) are similar with Uni being reconstructed from Fi,Mi, Un[1:i−1] and Xn or Y n,
where Fi,Mi are the random bin indices of Un[1:i] for i ∈ [2 : r]. Thus (61)-(67) guarantee us the following:
P (xn, yn, zn[1:2], f[1:r]) ≈ pUnif(f[1:r])p(xn, yn, zn[1:2]), (68)
P (xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w, f[1:r]) ≈ Pˆ (xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w, f[1:r]). (69)
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It follows from (68) and (69) that
lim
n→∞EB[‖P (x
n, yn, zn[1:2], f[1:r])− pUnif(f[1:r])p(xn, yn, zn[1:2])‖1
+
‖P (xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w, f[1:r])− Pˆ (xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w, f[1:r])‖1] = 0, (70)
where the expectation is taken over random binning. This implies that there exists a particular realization of the
random binning with the corresponding p.m.f. p so that we can replace P with p and denote the resulting p.m.f.’s
for protocols A and B respectively with p and pˆ, then
p(xn, yn, zn[1:2], f[1:r]) ≈ pUnif(f[1:r])p(xn, yn, zn[1:2]), (71)
p(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w, f[1:r]) ≈ pˆ(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w, f[1:r]). (72)
(71) alone was sufficient for channel simulation [6] as correctness was the only consideration there, but we need
to utilize (72) also in order to account for privacy. We do this with the help of the following claim. From (71) and
(72), we claim that there exists f∗[1:r] such that p(f
∗
[1:r]) > 0 and
p(xn, yn, zn[1:2]|f∗[1:r]) ≈ p(xn, yn, zn[1:2]), (73)
p(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w|f∗[1:2]) ≈ pˆ(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:2], w|f∗[1:2]). (74)
To see this, first we rewrite (71) and (72) as
p(xn, yn, zn[1:2], f[1:r])
n≈ pUnif(f[1:r])p(xn, yn, zn[1:2]), (75)
p(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w, f[1:r])
δn≈ pˆ(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w, f[1:r]), (76)
where n → 0 and δn → 0 as n→∞.
Note that pˆ(f[1:r]) = pUnif(f[1:r]) and (75) implies that p(f[1:r])
n≈ pUnif(f[1:r]). Now, using these it is easy to see
that (75) and (76) imply
p(f[1:r])p(x
n, yn, zn[1:2]|f[1:r])
2n≈ p(f[1:r])p(xn, yn, zn[1:2]), (77)
p(f[1:r])p(x
n, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w|f[1:r])
n+δn≈ p(f[1:r])pˆ(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w|f[1:r]). (78)
(77) and (78) imply ∑
f[1:r]
p(f[1:r])‖p(xn, yn, zn[1:2]|f[1:2])− p(xn, yn, zn[1:2])‖1 ≤ 2n, (79)∑
f[1:r]
p(f[1:r])‖p(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w|f[1:r])− pˆ(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w|f[1:r])‖1 ≤ n + δn. (80)
Adding (79) and (80) imply that there exists an instance f∗[1:r] such that p(f
∗
[1:r]) > 0 and
p(xn, yn, zn[1:2]|f∗[1:r])
3n+δn≈ p(xn, yn, zn[1:2]),
p(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w|f∗[1:r])
3n+δn≈ pˆ(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w|f∗[1:r]).
This proves the claim made in (73) − (74). Marginalizing away m[1:r] and w from (74) and using (73) gives us
correctness, pˆ(xn, yn, zn[1:2]|f∗[1:r]) ≈ p(xn, yn, zn[1:2]).
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For privacy, we first show that p(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w, f[1:r]) = p(x
n, yn, zn[1:2])p(m[1:r], w, f[1:r]|xn, zn1 ).
p(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w, f[1:r]) =
∑
un[1:r]
p(xn, yn, zn[1:2], u
n
[1:r],m[1:r], w, f[1:r])
=
∑
un[1:r]
p(xn, yn, zn[1:2])p(u
n
[1:r]|xn, yn, zn[1:2])p(m[1:r], w, f[1:r]|un[1:r])
=
∑
un[1:r]
p(xn, yn, zn[1:2])p(u
n
[1:r]|xn, zn1 )p(m[1:r], w, f[1:r]|un[1:r]) (81)
=
∑
un[1:r]
p(xn, yn, zn[1:2])p(u
n
[1:r],m[1:r], w, f[1:r]|xn, zn1 )
= p(xn, yn, zn[1:2])p(m[1:r], w, f[1:r]|xn, zn1 ),
where (81) follows from the fact that p(u[1:r], x, y, z[1:2]) satisfies the Markov chain U[1:r] − (X,Z1) − (Y,Z2).
Thus, we have
I(M[1:r],W, F[1:r];Y
n, Zn2 |Xn, Zn1 )|p(xn,yn,zn[1:2],m[1:r],w,f[1:r]) = 0
⇒ I(M[1:r],W ;Y n, Zn2 |Xn, Zn1 , F[1:r])|p(xn,yn,zn[1:2],m[1:r],w,f[1:r]) = 0
⇒ I(M[1:r],W ;Y n, Zn2 |Xn, Zn1 , F[1:r] = f[1:r])|p(xn,yn,zn[1:2],m[1:r],w,f[1:r]) = 0,∀f[1:r], s.t. p(f[1:r]) > 0
⇒ I(M[1:r],W ;Y n, Zn2 |Xn, Zn1 )|p(xn,yn,zn[1:2],m[1:r],w|f[1:r]) = 0, ∀f[1:r], s.t. p(f[1:r]) > 0
⇒ I(M[1:r],W ;Y n, Zn2 |Xn, Zn1 )|p(xn,yn,zn[1:2],m[1:r],w|f∗[1:r]) = 0,
where f∗[1:r] is fixed in (73).
Similarly, it can be proved that I(M[1:r],W ;Xn, Zn1 |Y n, Zn2 )|p(xn,yn,zn[1:2],m[1:r],w|f∗[1:r]) = 0 since p(u[1:r], x, y, z[1:2])
satisfies the Markov chain U[1:r] − (Y,Z2)− (X,Z1) also. Now, we have
I(M[1:r],W ;Y
n, Zn2 |Xn, Zn1 )|p(xn,yn,zn[1:2],m[1:r],w|f∗[1:r]) = 0, (82)
I(M[1:r],W ;X
n, Zn1 |Y n, Zn2 )|p(xn,yn,zn[1:2],m[1:r],w|f∗[1:2]) = 0, (83)
p(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:r], w|f∗[1:r]) ≈ pˆ(xn, yn, zn[1:2],m[1:2], w|f∗[1:r]). (84)
Since mutual information is a continuous function of the probability distribution, (82)− (84) imply
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(M[1:r],W ;Y
n, Zn2 |Xn, Zn1 )|pˆ(xn,yn,zn[1:2],m[1:r],w|f∗[1:r]) = 0,
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(M[1:r],W ;X
n, Zn1 |Y n, Zn2 )|pˆ(xn,yn,zn[1:2],m[1:r],w|f∗[1:r]) = 0,
using the following: if two random variables A and A′ with same support set A satisfy ||pA−pA′ ||1 ≤  ≤ 1/4, then
it follows from [31, Theorem 17.3.3] that |H(A)−H(A′)| ≤ η log |A|, where η → 0 as → 0. Finally, eliminating
(Rˆ1, . . . Rˆr) and (R1, . . . Rr) by applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination to (61)-(67) along with R12 =
∑
i:odd Ri,
R21 =
∑
i:even Ri, gives RAB−pvtA (r) by noticing that
I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) = I(X;Z2|Y ), (85)
I(Y ;U[1:r]|X) = I(Y ;Z1|X), (86)
I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y ) = I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ). (87)
This is because,
I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) = I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) + I(X;Z2|U[1:r], Y ) (88)
= I(X;U[1:r], Z2|Y )
= I(X;Z2|Y ) + I(X;U[1:r]|Z2, Y )
= I(X;Z2|Y ), (89)
26
where (88) follows from (8), and (89) follows from (10).
Similarly, we can show that I(Y ;U[1:r]|X) = I(Y ;Z1|X). Also,
I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y ) = I(U[1:r];Z1|X,Y ) + I(U[1:r];Z2|X,Y, Z1)
= I(U[1:r];Z1|X,Y ) (90)
= I(U[1:r];Z1|X,Y ) + I(Z2;Z1|U[1:r], X, Y ) (91)
= I(U[1:r], Z2;Z1|X,Y )
= I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ) + I(U[1:r];Z1|Z2, X, Y )
= I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ), (92)
where (90) follows from (9), (91) follows from (8), and (92) follows from (10). This completes the achievability
proof of the theorem.
Converse: Suppose a rate triple (R0, R12, R21) is achievable with privacy against both Alice and Bob. Then,
there exists a sequence of (n,R0, R12, R21) protocols such that for every  > 0, there exists a large enough n such
that ∥∥pXn,Y n,Zn1 ,Zn2 − qXn,Y n,Zn1 ,Zn2 ∥∥ ≤ , (93)
I(M[1:r],W ;Y
n, Zn2 |Xn, Zn1 ) ≤ n, (94)
I(M[1:r],W ;X
n, Zn1 |Y n, Zn2 ) ≤ n. (95)
Fix an  ∈ (0, 14 ]. Let T be a random variable uniformly distributed on [1 : n] and independent of all other
random variables. Define Uj := (Mj ,W,XT+1:n, Y 1:T−1, T ), for 1 ≤ j ≤ r, and X := XT , Y := YT , Z1 :=
Z1T , Z2 := Z2T . First, we show that this choice of auxiliary random variables satisfies the privacy conditions by
single-letterizing (94) and (95). Privacy condition against Alice (94) implies that
n ≥ I(M[1:r],W ;Y n, Zn2 | Xn, Zn1 )
= Hp(Y
n, Zn2 |Xn, Zn1 )−Hp(Y n, Zn2 |Xn, Zn1 ,M[1:r],W )
≥
n∑
i=1
Hq(Yi, Z2i|Xi, Z1i)− 1 −Hp(Yi, Z2i|Y 1:i−1, Z1:i−12 , Xn, Zn1 ,M[1:r],W ) (96)
≥
n∑
i=1
Hq(Yi, Z2i|Xi, Z1i)− 1 −Hp(Yi, Z2i|Xi+1:n, Y 1:i−1, Xi, Z1i,M[1:r],W )
≥
n∑
i=1
Hp(Yi, Z2i|Xi, Z1i)− 1 − 2 −Hp(Yi, Z2i|Xi+1:n, Y 1:i−1, Xi, Z1i,M[1:r],W ) (97)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Yi, Z2i;X
i+1:n, Y 1:i−1,M[1:r],W |Xi, Z1i)− 1 − 2
= n
[
I(YT , Z2T ;X
T+1:n, Y 1:T−1,M[1:r],W |XT , Z1T , T )− 1 − 2
]
= n
[
I(YT , Z2T ;X
T+1:n, Y 1:T−1,M[1:r],W, T |XT , Z1T )− I(YT , Z2T ;T |XT , Z1T )− 1 − 2
]
≥ n [I(YT , Z2T ;XT+1:n, Y 1:T−1,M[1:r],W, T |XT , Z1T )− 1 − 2 − 3] (98)
= n
[
I(Y, Z2;U[1:r]|X,Z1)− δ
]
, (99)
where (96)-(98) follow from the following fact: if two random variables A and A′ with same support set A satisfy
||pA− pA′ ||1 ≤  ≤ 1/4, then it follows from [31, Theorem 17.3.3] that |H(A)−H(A′)| ≤ η log |A|, where η → 0
as → 0. In (99), δ := 1 + 2 + 3 and δ → 0 as → 0.
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Privacy condition against Bob (95) implies that
n ≥ I(M[1:r],W ;Xn, Zn1 | Y n, Zn2 )
= Hp(X
n, Zn1 |Y n, Zn2 )−Hp(Xn, Zn1 |Y n, Zn2 ,M[1:r],W )
=
n∑
i=1
Hp(X
n, Zn1 |Y n, Zn2 )−Hp(Xi, Z1i|Xi+1:n, Zi+1:n1 , Y n, Zn2 ,M[1:r],W ) (100)
≥
n∑
i=1
Hq(Xi, Z1i|Yi, Z2i)− ′1 −Hp(Xi, Z1i|Xi+1:n, Zi+1:n1 , Y n, Zn2 ,M[1:r],W ) (101)
≥
n∑
i=1
Hq(Xi, Z1i|Yi, Z2i)− ′1 −Hp(Xi, Z1i|Y i+1:n, Xi+1:n, Yi, Z2i,M[1:r],W )
≥
n∑
i=1
Hp(Xi, Z1i|Yi, Z2i)− ′1 − ′2 −Hp(Xi, Z1i|Xi+1:n, Y 1:i−1, Yi, Z2i,M[1:r],W ) (102)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Z1i;X
i+1:n, Y 1:i−1,M[1:r],W |Yi, Z2i)− ′1 − ′2
= n
[
I(XT , Z1T ;X
T+1:n, Y 1:T−1,M[1:r],W |YT , Z2T , T )− ′1 − ′2
]
= n
[
I(XT , Z1T ;X
T+1:n, Y 1:T−1,M[1:r],W, T |YT , Z2T )− I(XT , Z1T ;T |YT , Z2T )− ′1 − ′2
]
≥ n [I(X,Z1;U[1:r]|Y,Z2)− ′1 − ′2 − ′3] (103)
= n
[
I(X,Z1;U[1:r]|Y,Z2)− δ′
]
, (104)
where (100) follows from the chain rule, H(An) =
∑n
i=1H(Ai|Ai+1:n) and (101)-(104) follow due to the same
reasons as that of (96)-(99) with δ′ := ′1 + ′2 + ′3 so that, δ′ → 0 as → 0.
It can be shown along similar lines as [6, Theorem 1] that
R12 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ),
R21 ≥ I(Y ;U[1:r]|X),
R0 +R12 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) + I(U1;Z1, Z2|X,Y )− 3g(),
R0 +R12 +R21 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) + I(Y ;U[1:r]|X) + I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y )− 3g(),
for conditional p.m.f. p(u[1:r], z1, z2|x, y) satisfying
‖pX,Y,Z1,Z2 − qX,Y,Z1,Z2‖ ≤ , (105)
Ui − (U[1:i−1], X)− Y, if i is odd, (106)
Ui − (U[1:i−1], Y )−X, if i is even, (107)
Z1 − (U[1:r], X)− (Y, Z2), (108)
Z2 − (U[1:r], Y )− (X,Z1), (109)
where g()→ 0 as → 0.
So, we have shown that (R0, R12, R21) ∈ S(r) for every  > 0, where S(r) is defined to be the set of all
non-negative rate triples (R0, R12, R21) for which there exists a p.m.f. p(u[1:r], x, y, z[1:2]) such that
R12 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y )
R21 ≥ I(Y ;U[1:r]|X)
R0 +R12 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) + I(U1;Z1, Z2|X,Y )− 3g()
R0 +R12 +R21 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) + I(Y ;U[1:r]|X) + I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y )− 3g(),
‖pX,Y,Z1,Z2 − qX,Y,Z1,Z2‖ ≤ ,
Ui − (U[1:i−1], X)− Y, if i is odd,
Ui − (U[1:i−1], Y )−X, if i is even,
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Z1 − (U[1:r], X)− (Y, Z2),
Z2 − (U[1:r], Y )− (X,Z1),
I(U[1:r];Y, Z2|X,Z1) ≤ h1(),
I(U[1:r];X,Z1|Y,Z2) ≤ h2(), (110)
where g(), h1() and h2()→ 0 as → 0.
Now we argue that imposing the cardinality bounds |U1| ≤ |X ||Y||Z1||Z2|+5, |Ui| ≤ |X ||Y||Z1||Z2|
∏i−1
j=1 |Uj |+
4, ∀i > 1 on the p.m.f. does not alter the set S(r). The argument is along similar lines as [6, Appendix D] which
uses the Convex Cover Method [33, Appendix C]. The alphabet U1 should have |X ||Y||Z1||Z2| − 1 elements to
preserve the joint distribution pX,Y,Z1,Z2 , which in turn preserves
H(X|Y ), H(Y |X), H(Z1, Z2|X,Y ), H(Y, Z2|X,Z1), H(X,Z1|Y,Z2),
and 6 more elements to preserve
H(X|U[1:r], Y ), H(Y |U[1:r], X), H(Z1, Z2|U1, X, Y ), H(Z1, Z2|U[1:r], X, Y ), H(Y,Z2|U[1:r], X, Z1) and
H(X,Z1|U[1:r], Y, Z2). The alphabet Ui, i > 1, should have |X ||Y||Z1||Z2|
∏i−1
j=1 |Uj | − 1 elements to preserve the
joint distribution pX,Y,Z1,Z2,U[1:i−1] , which in turn preserves
H(X|Y ), H(Y |X), H(Z1, Z2|X,Y ), H(Y,Z2|X,Z1), H(X,Z1|Y,Z2), H(Z1, Z2|U1, X, Y ),
and 5 more elements to preserve
H(X|U[1:r], Y ), H(Y |U[1:r], X), H(Z1, Z2|U[1:r], X, Y ), H(Y, Z2|U[1:r], X, Z1), H(X,Z1|U[1:r], Y, Z2).
Using the continuity of mutual information and total variation distance in the probability simplex, it can be shown
(similar to [6, Lemma 6]) that
⋂
>0 S(r) is equal to RAB−pvtA (r) by invoking (85)-(87). This concludes the proof
of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof of part (i): It is trivial to see the ‘if’ part since (5)-(10) define an r-round perfectly secure protocol of
blocklength one, i.e., the protocol satisfies (2)-(4) with n = 1 and  = 0. For the ‘only if’ part, it suffices to show
that every (qX,Y , qZ1,Z2|X,Y ) that is computable with asymptotic security, is also computable with perfect security.
Assume that (qX,Y , qZ1,Z2|X,Y ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both users. This implies
that for every  > 0, there exists a large enough n and a protocol Πn that satisfies the following conditions:∥∥∥p(induced)Xn,Y n,Zn1 ,Zn2 − qXn,Y n,Zn1 ,Zn2 ∥∥∥1 ≤ ,
Mi − (M[1:i−1], Xn)− Y n, if i is odd,
Mi − (M[1:i−1], Y n)−Xn, if i is even,
Zn1 − (M[1:r], Xn)− (Y n, Zn2 ),
Zn2 − (M[1:r], Y n)− (Xn, Zn1 ),
I(M[1:r],W ;Y
n, Zn2 |Xn, Zn1 ) ≤ n,
I(M[1:r],W ;X
n, Zn1 |Y n, Zn2 ) ≤ n. (111)
Single-letterization as done in the converse of the Theorem 2 implies that for every ′ > 0 (by suitably selecting 
in (111)), there exists a p.m.f. p(u[1:r], x, y, z1, z2) which satisfies the following conditions.
‖pX,Y,Z1,Z2 − qX,Y,Z1,Z2‖1 ≤ ′,
Ui − (U[1:i−1], X)− Y, if i is odd,
Ui − (U[1:i−1], Y )−X, if i is even,
Z1 − (U[1:r], X)− (Y,Z2),
Z2 − (U[1:r], Y )− (X,Z1),
I(U[1:r];X,Z1|Y,Z2) ≤ ′,
I(U[1:r];Y,Z2|X,Z1) ≤ ′. (112)
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For a fixed (qX,Y , qZ1,Z2|X,Y ), consider the following set.
S :=
{
pU[1:r],Z1,Z2|X,Y : ‖pX,Y,Z1,Z2 − qX,Y,Z1,Z2‖1 ≤ ,
Ui − (U[1:i−1], X)− Y, if i is odd,
Ui − (U[1:i−1], Y )−X, if i is even,
Z1 − (U[1:r], X)− (Y,Z2),
Z2 − (U[1:r], Y )− (X,Z1),
I(U[1:r];X,Z1|Y, Z2) ≤ ,
I(U[1:r];Y, Z2|X,Z1) ≤ 
}
. (113)
From (112), it is clear that S is non-empty for every  > 0. For a monotonically decreasing sequence 1 > 2 > . . .
with limk→∞ k = 0, it is easy to see that S1 ⊇ S2 ⊇ . . . . Now, in order to prove that (qX,Y , qZ1,Z2|X,Y )
is computable with perfect security it suffices to show that S0 is non-empty. We show this by first arguing that
limk→∞
⋂k
i=1 Sk is non-empty and then proving that S0 = limk→∞
⋂k
i=1 Sk . Using the continuity of total variation
distance and continuity of mutual information we show below that S is compact (bounded and closed) for every
 > 0.
Boundedness of S: For a given (qX,Y , qZ1,Z2|X,Y ), for every p(u, z1, z2|x, y) that satisfies (113), it follows from
the Convex Cover Method [33, Appendix C] along similar lines as cardinality bounds of part (i) that there exists
another p.m.f. p(u, z1, z2|x, y) with |U1| ≤ |X ||Y||Z1||Z2| + 1, |Ui| ≤ |X ||Y||Z1||Z2|
∏i−1
j=1 |Uj | + 1, ∀i > 1
satisfying (113). This implies that all the probability vectors p(u, z1, z2|x, y) in S are of finite dimension and
hence the set S is bounded.
Closedness of S: Consider a sequence of p.m.f.’s p(k)U[1:r],Z1,Z2|X,Y converging to a p.m.f. rU[1:r],Z1,Z2|X,Y , where
p
(k)
U[1:r],Z1,Z2|X,Y ∈ S,∀k ∈ N. For simplicity, we abbreviate p
(k)
U[1:r],Z1,Z2|X,Y and rU[1:r],Z1,Z2|X,Y by p
(k) and r
respectively. Since mutual information is a continuous function of the distribution, it follows from the definition
of the continuous function that Ip(k)(U[1:r];X,Z1|Y,Z2) converges to Ir(U[1:r];X,Z1|Y,Z2) as p(k) converges to
r. Now since Ip(k)(U[1:r];X,Z1|Y,Z2) ≤ , ∀k ∈ N, it follows by taking limit k → ∞ on both sides, that
Ir(U[1:r];X,Z1|Y,Z2) ≤ . Similarly we can prove that Ir(U[1:r];Y,Z2|X,Z1) ≤ . Since l1-norm is also a
continuous function, ‖rX,Y,Z1,Z2 − qX,Y,Z1,Z2‖1 ≤  also follows similarly. So, we have r ∈ S and hence S
is closed.
By Cantor’s intersection theorem, which states that a decreasing nested sequence of non-empty compact sets
has non-empty intersection, we have that limk→∞
⋂k
i=1 Sk is non-empty. To show S0 = limk→∞
⋂k
i=1 Sk , note
that S0 ⊆ limk→∞
⋂k
i=1 Sk holds trivially because S shrinks as  shrinks. For the other direction, assume that
γU[1:r],Z1,Z2|X,Y ∈ limk→∞
⋂k
i=1 Sk . For simplicity, we abbreviate γU[1:r],Z1,Z2|X,Y by γ in the following. Since
γ ∈ Sk , ∀k, we have I(U[1:r];X,Z1|Y,Z2) ≤ k, ∀k ∈ N. Now since limk→∞ k = 0 and mutual information is
always non-negative, we have Iγ(U[1:r];X,Z1|Y,Z2) = 0. Similarly, we can prove that Iγ(U[1:r];Y, Z2|X,Z1) = 0
and ‖pX,Y,Z1,Z2 − qX,Y,Z1,Z2‖1|γ = 0. The latter conclusion implies that γX,Y,Z1,Z2 = qX,Y,Z1,Z2 . This shows that
γ ∈ S0, which concludes the proof of part (i).
Proof of part (ii): Suppose (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both
users using an r-round protocol in which Alice starts the communication. Then by part (i), there exists a conditional
p.m.f. p(u[1:r]|x, y, z1, z2) satisfying (5)-(10). So, the joint distribution can be written as
p(x, y, u[1:r], z1, z2) = q(x, y)p(u[1:r]|x, y)p(z1|u[1:r], x)p(z2|u[1:r], y).
Consider another joint distribution,
p˜(x, y, u[1:r], z1, z2) = q˜(x, y)p(u[1:r]|x, y)p(z1|u[1:r], x)p(z2|u[1:r], y).
Notice that p(u[1:r], z1, z2|x, y) = p˜(u[1:r], z1, z2|x, y) = p(u[1:r]|x, y)p(z1|u[1:r], x)p(z2|u[1:r], y). We show that
p˜(x, y, u[1:r], z1, z2) also satisfies (5)-(10), thereby making the function (q˜XY , qZ1Z2|XY ) asymptotically securely
computable in r-rounds. It is trivial to see that (5)-(8) depends only on p(u[1:r]|x, y), p(z1|u[1:r], x) and p(z2|u[1:r], y)
which are common in both the distributions p(x, y, u[1:r], z1, z2) and p˜(x, y, u[1:r], z1, z2). Hence, since the p.m.f.
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p(x, y, u[1:r], z1, z2) satisfies (5)-(8), p˜(x, y, u[1:r], z1, z2) also satisfies (5)-(8). It remains to show that the p.m.f.
p˜(x, y, u[1:r], z1, z2) satisfies (9)-(10). For x, y, z1, z2 s.t. p˜(x, y, z1, z2) > 0, consider
p˜(u[1:r]|x, y, z1, z2) =
p˜(u[1:r], z1, z2|x, y)
p˜(z1, z2|x, y)
=
p(u[1:r], z1, z2|x, y)
p(z1, z2|x, y) (114)
= p(u[1:r]|x, y, z1, z2).
Notice that p(u[1:r]|x, y, z1, z2) is well-defined since supp(q˜XY ) ⊆ supp(qXY ). (114) follows because p(u[1:r], z1, z2|x, y) =
p˜(u[1:r], z1, z2|x, y). Now, for x, y, z1, z2 s.t. p˜(x, y, z1, z2) > 0, since p˜(u[1:r]|x, y, z1, z2) = p(u[1:r]|x, y, z1, z2),
we have that p˜(x, y, u[1:r], z1, z2) satisfies (9)-(10) also. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 3: Part (i) follows directly from Theorem 2. For part (ii), we show that, for the class of
functions mentioned in the statement of theorem, if a scheme computes (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) with R12 and R21 equal
to I(Z2;X|Y )+δ and I(Z1;Y |X)+δ respectively, and with some R0, under no privacy, then this scheme will also
satisfy the privacy conditions (3)-(4). From the converse of [6, Theorem 1], we have nR12 ≥ I(M[1:r];Xn|Y n,W ).
Then we get
nR12 ≥ I(M[1:r];Xn|Y n,W )
= I(M[1:r],W ;X
n|Y n) (115)
= I(M[1:r],W ;X
n|Y n)
+ I(Zn2 ;X
n|M[1:r],W, Y n) (116)
= I(Zn2 ,M[1:r],W ;X
n|Y n)
= I(Zn2 ;X
n|Y n) + I(M[1:r],W ;Xn|Y n, Zn2 ) (117)
= I(Zn2 ;X
n|Y n) + I(M[1:r],W ;Xn, Zn1 |Y n, Zn2 )− I(M[1:r],W ;Zn1 |Xn, Y n, Zn2 )
≥ I(Zn2 ;Xn|Y n) + I(M[1:r],W ;Xn, Zn1 |Y n, Zn2 )−H(Zn1 |Xn, Y n, Zn2 )
≥ n [I(Z2;X|Y )− 1] + I(M[1:r],W ;Xn, Zn1 |Y n, Zn2 )− n [H(Z1|X,Y, Z2) + 2] , (118)
where (115) is due to the independence of common randomness W and (Xn, Y n), (116) follows from the Markov
chain Zn2 − (W,Y n,M[1:r]) − (Xn, Zn1 ). We used the following fact in (118): if two random variables A and
A′ with same support set A satisfy ||pA − pA′ ||1 ≤  ≤ 1/4, then it follows from [31, Theorem 17.3.3] that
|H(A)−H(A′)| ≤ η log |A|, where η → 0 as → 0. Now (2) implies (118), where 1, 2 → 0 as → 0.
When H(Z1|X,Y, Z2) = 0, from (118) we have I(M[1:r],W ;Xn, Zn1 |Y n, Zn2 ) ≤ δ + 1 + 2 for δ → 0, and
1, 2 → 0 as  → 0, which is the required privacy condition against Bob. Similar argument holds for R21 when
H(Z2|X,Y, Z1) = 0.
Proofs of Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 are along similar lines as that of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 jointly, by
noticing the following and hence omitted. When privacy against Alice is required,
I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y ) = I(U[1:r];Z1|X,Y ) + I(U[1:r];Z2|X,Y, Z1) (119)
= I(U[1:r];Z1|X,Y ), (120)
where (120) follows from (3).
I(U1;Z1, Z2|X,Y ) = I(U1;Z1|X,Y ) + I(U1;Z2|X,Y, Z1) (121)
= I(U1;Z1|X,Y ), (122)
where (122) follows from (3). Similarly, when privacy is required against Bob, we have I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y ) =
I(U[1:r];Z2|X,Y ) and I(U1;Z1, Z2|X,Y ) = I(U1;Z2|X,Y ).
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APPENDIX B
CUT-SET BOUNDS FOR RANDOMIZED INTERACTIVE FUNCTION COMPUTATION
For a randomized interactive function computation problem, we prove lower bounds for R12 and R21. To lower
bound R12, note that all the inequalities upto (117) in the proof of Theorem 3 will follow even for function
computation without any privacy requirement. Then we get
nR12 ≥ I(Zn2 ;Xn|Y n) + I(M[1:r],W ;Xn|Y n, Zn2 ) (123)
≥ I(Zn2 ;Xn|Y n)
≥ n[I(Z2;X|Y )− ′], (124)
where in (124) we have used the fact: if two random variables A and A′ with same support set A satisfy ||pA −
pA′ ||1 ≤  ≤ 1/4, then it follows from [31, Theorem 17.3.3] that |H(A) −H(A′)| ≤ η log |A|, where η → 0 as
 → 0. Now (2) implies (124), where ′ → 0 as  → 0. Thus, we have R12 ≥ I(Z2;X|Y ) − ′, where ′ → 0
as  → 0. So, as  → 0 we have R12 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ). Similarly, R21 ≥ I(Y ;Z1|X). These are the cut-set lower
bounds.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THE OPTIMAL RATE FOR EXAMPLE 2 IN SECTION IV-B
We use the following lemma.
Lemma 3 ([9], [10]). If X and Y are independent, then the following holds for any U[1:r] satisfying (5) and (6).
I(X;Y |U[1:r]) = 0. (125)
Proof: We prove a more general statement, i.e., for any U[1:r] satisfying (5) and (6), we have I(X;Y |U[1:i]) ≤
I(X;Y ) for any i ∈ [1 : r]. We show this by induction on i. The base case, for i = 1 is true since,
I(X;Y |U1) ≤ I(X;Y |U1) + I(U1;Y )
= I(X,U1;Y )
= I(X;Y ) + I(U1;Y |X)
= I(X;Y ), (126)
where (126) follows from (5). Now suppose that I(X;Y |U[1:i]) ≤ I(X;Y ). Assume that i is odd. Then we have
I(X;Y |U[1:i+1]) ≤ I(X;Y |U[1:i+1]) + I(X;Ui+1|U[1:i])
= I(X;Ui+1, Y |U[1:i])
= I(X;Y |U[1:i]) + I(X;Ui+1|Y,U[1:i])
= I(X;Y |U[1:i]) (127)
≤ I(X;Y ),
where (127) follows from (6). One can prove that I(X;Y |U[1:i+1]) ≤ I(X;Y ) for the case when i is even using
(5). This completes the proof of lemma.
The proof of logm+ 1 + 1/2 being the optimal sum-rate for any arbitrary rounds follows along similar lines as
that of showing that logm+m+ 1/2 to be the optimal sum-rate for two round protocols. It is outlined below. We
show that H(YJ |U[1:r], J) = 0. Let us assume H(YJ |U[1:r], J) 6= 0. This implies that ∃ u[1:r] and j such that
P (Yj = 0, U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) > 0
P (Yj = 1, U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) > 0.
These two further imply that ∃ y, y′ such that y(j) = 0, y′(j) = 1, and
P (Y = y, U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) > 0 (128)
P (Y = y′, U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) > 0. (129)
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Now we analyse two cases as before.
Case 1: H(V |U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) 6= 0 (130)
Case 2: H(V |U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) = 0. (131)
Case 1 (H(V |U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) 6= 0) :
This implies the following:
P (V = 0, U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) > 0 (132)
P (V = 1, U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) > 0. (133)
(132), (129) and Lemma 3 imply that
P (V = 0, J = j, U[1:r] = u[1:r], Y = y
′) > 0. (134)
Similarly, (133), (129) and Lemma 3 imply that
P (V = 1, J = j, U[1:r] = u[1:r], Y = y
′) > 0. (135)
From (134) and (135), we get H(V ∧ YJ |U[1:r], Y, J) 6= 0. Then we have H(V ∧ YJ |U[1:r], Y ) 6= 0 which is a
contradiction.
Case 2 (H(V |U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) = 0) :
This condition implies either
P (V = 0, U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) > 0 (136)
P (V = 1, U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) = 0, (137)
or
P (V = 1, U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) > 0
P (V = 0, U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) = 0.
Let us consider the first case. Then (136), (137), (128) and Lemma 3 imply that P (V = 0, J = j, U[1:r] =
u[1:r], Y = y, V ∧ Yj = 0) > 0 and P (V = 1, J = j, U[1:r] = u[1:r], Y = y, V ∧ Yj = 0) = 0. This violates the
Markov chain U[1:r] − (Y,Z)−X . Similarly, the second case also violates the Markov chain U[1:r] − (Y, Z)−X .
This shows that H(V |U[1:r] = u[1:r], J = j) can not be zero.
From Theorem 5, we have R21 ≥ I(Y ;U[1:r]|X). Then we get the following
I(Y ;U[1:r]|X) ≥ I(YJ ;U[1:r]|V, J)
= H(YJ |V, J)−H(YJ |V, J, U[1:r])
≥ H(YJ |V, J)−H(YJ |J, U[1:r])
= H(YJ |V, J) = 1.
So we have R21 ≥ 1. From the cut-set bound, we have R12 ≥ H(Z|Y ) = logm+1/2. This implies that sum-rate
is lower bounded by logm+ 1/2 + 1 by any r round protocol.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
In view of Theorem 4, it suffices to show that
min
pU|X :
U−X−(Y,Z)
Z−(U,Y )−X
I(U ;X|Y ) = min
pW |X :
W−X−Y
X∈W∈Γ (G)
I(W ;X|Y ).
A similar result for deterministic functions was proved by Orlitsky and Roche [4, Theorem 2]. Since we are dealing
with randomized functions, the proof of this proposition is slightly more involved.
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≤: Suppose pW |X achieves the minimum on the right hand side. Then W is a random variable such that it
takes values in the set Γ (G) of independent sets of G such that X ∈ W . Now we define a joint distribution
pXYWZ(x, y, w, z) as follows:
pXYWZ(x, y, w, z) :=

0 if qXY (x, y) = 0,
0 if qXY (x, y) > 0 and x /∈ w,
qXY (x, y)pW |X(w|x)pZ|XY (z|x, y) if qXY (x, y) > 0 and x ∈ w.
Note that the above-defined pXYWZ satisfies the Markov chains W − X − Y and Z − (X,Y ) −W . These two
Markov chain together implies that W −X − (Y, Z) is also a Markov chain. Now we show that pXYWZ satisfies
Z− (W,Y )−X too. Consider any independent set, say w ∈ G. Consider any pair (y, z) ∈ Y ×Z . By definition of
G, pZ|XY (z|x, y) is the same for all x ∈ w with qXY (x, y) > 0. Hence, pZ|XY (z|x, y) can be uniquely determined
from (w, y, z) where x ∈ w; therefore, the Markov chain Z − (W,Y ) −X holds. The inequality now follows by
taking U = W .
≥: Suppose pU |X achieves the minimum on the left hand side such that U−X−(Y, Z) and Z−(U, Y )−X hold.
Now define a random variable W as a function of U in the following way: w = w(u) := {x : pUX(u, x) > 0}.
We need to show that the induced conditional distribution pW |X satisfies the following three conditions: 1) the
Markov chain W −X − Y holds; 2) X ∈ W , i.e., pXW (x,w) > 0 =⇒ x ∈ w; and 3) W is an independent set
in G = (X , E). We show these conditions below.
1) The Markov chain W −X − Y holds because U −X − (Y, Z) holds and W is a function of U .
2) If pWX(w, x) > 0 then ∃u s.t. w = w(u) and pUX(u, x) > 0, which implies that x ∈ w.
3) To prove that w is an independent set we suppose, to the contrary, that w is not an independent set, which means
that ∃x, x′, u, where w = w(u), x, x′ ∈ w, {x, x′} ∈ E , and such that pU |X(u|x)·pU |X(u|x′) > 0. By definition
of G, {x, x′} being an edge in E implies that ∃(y, z) ∈ Y ×Z such that pZ|XY (z|x, y) 6= pZ|X,Y (z|x′, y) and
qXY (x, y) · qXY (x′, y) > 0. Assume, without loss of generality, that pZ|XY (z|x, y) > 0. Consider (u, x, y, z).
We can expand pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) in two different ways. The first expansion is as follows:
pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) = pU |XY (u|x, y)pZ|UXY (z|u, x, y)
= pU |X(u|x)pZ|UY (z|u, y), (138)
where in the second equality we used U −X−Y to write pU |XY (u|x, y) = pU |X(u|x) and Z− (U, Y )−X to
write pZ|UXY (z|u, x, y) = pZ|UY (z|u, y) (note that pZ|UXY (z|u, x, y) is well-defined, because pUXY (u, x, y)
= qXY (x, y)pU |X(u|x) > 0). We can expand pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) in the following way also:
pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) = pZ|XY (z|x, y)pU |XY Z(u|x, y, z)
= pZ|XY (z|x, y)pU |X(u|x), (139)
where in the second equality we used the Markov chain U−X−(Y,Z) to write pU |XY Z(u|x, y, z) = pU |X(u|x)
(note that pU |XY Z(u|x, y, z) is well-defined, because pXY Z(x, y, z) > 0). Since pU |X(u|x) > 0, comparing
(138) and (139) gives
pZ|XY (z|x, y) = pZ|UY (z|u, y). (140)
The above equality, together with pZ|XY (z|x, y) > 0, implies pZ|UY (z|u, y) > 0. Now consider (u, x′, y, z),
and expand pUZ|XY (u, z|x′, y) along the first expansion above in (138). This gives:
pUZ|XY (u, z|x′, y) = pU |X(u|x′)pZ|UY (z|u, y). (141)
Since all the terms on the RHS are greater than zero, we have pUZ|XY (u, z|x′, y) > 0. Now expanding
pUZ|XY (u, z|x′, y) along the second expansion in (139) above gives
pUZ|XY (u, z|x′, y) = pZ|XY (z|x′, y)pU |X(u|x′). (142)
On comparing (141) and (142), and using pU |X(u|x′) > 0, we get pZ|XY (z|x′, y) = pZ|UY (z|u, y), which
together with (140), leads to a contradiction to our assumption that pZ|XY (z|x, y) 6= pZ|XY (z|x′, y).
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
First we explicitly characterize (qXY , qZ|XY ) that are perfectly securely computable with privacy against both
users. Kilian [34] gave a characterization of such qZ|XY with no input distribution. Essentially the same character-
ization holds for general (qXY , qZ|XY ) as well, and we prove it in our language in Lemma 4; it will be useful in
understanding the later results.
We say that C × D, where C ⊆ X , D ⊆ Y , is column monochromatic, if for every y ∈ D, if there exists
x, x′ ∈ C such that qXY (x, y), qXY (x′, y) > 0, then qZ|XY (z|x, y) = qZ|XY (z|x′, y), ∀z ∈ Z .
Lemma 4. [34, Lemma 5.1] Let X = X1
⊎X2⊎ . . .⊎Xk be the partition induced by the equivalence relation ≡.
Then, (qXY , qZ|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against both users if and only if each Xi × Y ,
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, is column monochromatic.
Proof: (Only if part, ⇒): Let U denote the message sent by Alice to Bob. Let (p(u|x), p(z|u, y)) be a pair of
encoder and decoder that perfectly securely computes (qXY , qZ|XY ) with privacy against both users, i.e., the joint
distribution p(x, y, u, z) = p(x, y)p(u|x)p(z|u, y) satisfies the following correctness and privacy conditions:
Correctness: p(x, y, z) = qXY (x, y)qZ|XY (z|x, y), ∀x, y, z, (143)
Privacy against Alice: U −X − (Y,Z), (144)
Privacy against Bob: U − (Y,Z)−X. (145)
Consider an equivalence class Xi. First we prove that p(u|x) = p(u|x′) for every message u and every x, x′ ∈ Xi.
Since Xi is an equivalence class of ≡, we have x ≡ x′, and by the definition of x ≡ x′, there exists x =
x1, x2, . . . , xl−1, xl = x′ such that xi ∼ xi+1 for every 0 ≤ i ≤ l−1. Consider xi, xi+1 for some i in this sequence.
Since xi ∼ xi+1, there exists y, z such that q(xi, y), q(xi+1, y), q(z|xi, y), q(z|xi+1, y) > 0. (These will ensure that
all the conditional probabilities in the following equations are well-defined.) Fix a message u and consider the
following:
p(u|xi) = p(u|xi, y, z)
= p(u|xi+1, y, z)
= p(u|xi+1),
where the first and third equalities follow from (144), and the second equality follows from (145). Since the above
argument holds for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}, we have p(u|x) = p(u|x′) for every x, x′ ∈ Xi. Hence, U is
conditionally independent of X , conditioned on the equivalence class to which X belongs.
Now take any y ∈ Y . We prove that if there exists x, x′ ∈ Xi such that qXY (x, y) > 0, qXY (x′, y) > 0, then
qZ|XY (z|x, y) = qZ|XY (z|x′, y) for every z ∈ Z . Take any u such that p(u|x) > 0, then p(u|x′) = p(u|x) > 0.
Take an arbitrary z ∈ Z . Consider (x, y, u, z) and expand p(u, z|x, y) as follows:
p(u, z|x, y) = p(u|x)p(z|u, y). (146)
We can expand p(u, z|x, y) in another way:
p(u, z|x, y) = q(z|x, y)p(u|x, y, z)
= q(z|x, y)p(u|x). (147)
In (147) we used (144) to write p(u|x, y, z) = p(u|x). Comparing (146) and (147) we get
q(z|x, y) = p(z|u, y). (148)
Running the same arguments with (x′, y, u, z) we get
q(z|x′, y) = p(z|u, y). (149)
Comparing (148) and (149) gives q(z|x, y) = q(z|x′, y). Since the protocol is correct, i.e., p(z|x, y) = qZ|XY (z|x, y),
we have our desired result that pZ|XY (z|x, y) = pZ|XY (z|x′, y).
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(If part, ⇐): If Xi×Y , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, is column monochromatic, then we give a simple encoder-decoder pair
to perfectly securely compute (qXY , qZ|XY ). Take U = {1, 2, . . . , k}. Now define the encoder-decoder as follows:
• Encoder: pU |X(i|x) := 1{x∈Xi}, i.e., on input x, Alice sends the unique index i ∈ [k] such that x ∈ Xi.
• Decoder: pZ|UY (z|i, y) := qZ|XY (z|x, y), for any x ∈ Xi such that qXY (x, y) > 0. (If no such x is there,
leave pZ|UY (z|i, y) undefined.)
Upon observing x as input, Alice sends the index i such that x ∈ Xi. On observing y ∈ Y and receiving i ∈
[1 : k] from Alice, Bob outputs z with probability pZ|UY (z|i, y). Note that pZ|UY (z|i, y) is well-defined, because
qXY (x, y) > 0. It can be easily verified that the above pair of encoder-decoder computes (qXY , qZ|XY ) with perfect
security against both users.
The above encoder-decoder may not be optimal in terms of communication complexity. Consider any two
equivalence classes Xi and Xj . Let Yi := {y ∈ Y : ∃x ∈ Xi s.t. qXY (x, y) > 0}; Yj is defined similarly.
Suppose Yi ∩ Yj = φ. Then, Alice can send the same message whether x ∈ Xi or x ∈ Xj , and Bob will still be
able to correctly compute qZ|XY .
Consider an encoder-decoder pair (pU |X , pZ|UY ) that securely computes (qXY , qZ|XY ) with privacy against both
users. For i = 1, 2, . . . , k, define Ui as follows:
Ui := {u ∈ U : p(u|x) > 0, for some x ∈ Xi}.
Claim 4. For some i, j ∈ [1 : k], i 6= j, if there exists x ∈ Xi and x′ ∈ Xj such that qXY (x, y) > 0, qXY (x′, y) > 0
for some y ∈ Y , then Ui ∩ Uj = φ.
Proof: We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose there exists i, j ∈ [1 : k], i 6= j, and x ∈ Xi, x′ ∈ Xj
such that qXY (x, y) > 0, qXY (x′, y) > 0 for some y ∈ Y , and Ui ∩Uj 6= φ. Since qXY (x, y) > 0, there is a z ∈ Z
with qZ|XY (z|x, y) > 0. Since x and x′ are not in the same equivalence class, we have qZ|XY (z|x′, y) = 0.
Suppose u ∈ Ui ∩ Uj . It follows from the definition of Ui and the proof of Lemma 4 that p(u|x) > 0 and
p(u|x′) > 0. Now consider (x, y, u, z) and by expanding p(u, z|x, y) in two different ways (similar to what we
did in the proof of Lemma 4) we get qZ|XY (z|x, y) = p(z|u, y). Applying the same arguments with (x′, y, u, z)
gives qZ|XY (z|x′, y) = p(z|u, y). These imply qZ|XY (z|x, y) = qZ|XY (z|x′, y), which is a contradiction, because
by assumption qZ|XY (z|x, y) > 0 and qZ|XY (z|x′, y) = 0. Hence, Ui ∩ Uj must be empty.
From the proof of Lemma 4 we have that the U is conditionally independent of the input X conditioned on
the equivalence class to which X belongs. This, together with Claim 4 suggests replacing all the elements in
Xi, i ∈ [1 : k], by a single element xi, which induces a new random variable, which we denote by XEQ. Note that
XEQ takes values in the set XEQ := {x1, x2, . . . , xk}, where xi is the representative of the equivalence class Xi.
Thus we can define an equivalent problem (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ) as follows:
• Define qXEQY (xi, y) :=
∑
x∈Xi qXY (x, y) for every (xi, y) ∈ (XEQ × Y).
• For (xi, y) ∈ (XEQ × Y), if there exists x ∈ Xi s.t. qXY (x, y) > 0, then define qZ|XEQY (z|xi, y) :=
qZ|XY (z|x, y), for every z ∈ Z . If there exists no x ∈ Xi s.t. qXY (x, y) > 0, then it does not matter
what the conditional distribution qZ|XEQY (z|xi, y) is; in particular, we can define qZ|XEQY (.|xi, y) to be the
uniform distribution in {1, 2, . . . , |Z|}.
Note that U−XEQ−X is a Markov chain. The above definition is for (qXY , qZ|XY ) which are perfectly securely
computable with privacy against both users as per Lemma 4.
Remark 7. Suppose (qXY , qZ|XY ) is securely computable. Observe that Bob always learns which equivalence class
Xi Alice’s input lies in. This is because ∀(y, z) ∈ Y × Z such that qY Z(y, z) > 0, there is a unique x ∈ XEQ s.t.
qXEQY (x, y) > 0 and qZ|XEQY (z|x, y) > 0.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2: Let (pU |X , pZ|UY ) be an encoder-decoder pair that securely computes (qXY , qZ|XY ).
Consider the following encoder-decoder pair (pU˜ |XEQ , pZ|U˜Y ) for securely computing the reduced function, that
is (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ). The alphabet of XEQ is XEQ = {x1, x2, . . . , xk}, where xi is the representative element of
the equivalence class Xi in the partition X = X1
⊎X2⊎ . . .⊎Xk generated by the equivalence relation ≡; see
Definition 8. Encoder is defined as follows: for every i ∈ [1 : k], define pU˜ |XEQ(u|xi) := pU |X(u|x) for any x ∈ Xi.
This is well-defined, because pU |X(u|x) is identical for every x in an equivalence class (see the proof of Lemma
4). Decoder remains the same, i.e., pZ|U˜Y = pZ|UY . Note that the encoder pU˜ |XEQ is defined on a subset of X , and
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on that subset it is identical to pU |X . This implies that, since (pU |X , pZ|UY ) securely computes (qXY , qZ|XY ), the
above-defined (pU˜ |XEQ , pZ|U˜Y ) will also securely compute (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ).
For the other direction, let (pU˜ |XEQ , pZ|U˜Y ) securely computes (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ). Now consider the following
encoder-decoder pair (pU |X , pZ|UY ) for securely computing (qXY , qZ|XY ). Encoder is defined as follows: for any
x ∈ X , define pU |X(u|x) := pU˜ |XEQ(u|xi), where x ∈ Xi. Decoder remains the same, i.e., pZ|UY = pZ|U˜Y . Note
that pU |X(u|x) must be identical for every x in an equivalence class (see the proof of Lemma 4). Therefore, since
pU˜ |XEQ(u|xi) is a valid choice for pU |X(u|xi), where xi is the representative element of the equivalence class Xi,
it follows that the above-defined encoder-decoder pair (pU |X , pZ|UY ) will also securely compute (qXY , qZ|XY ).
In the following we show that L(U) and L(U˜) have the same p.m.f. For simplicity, let L = L(U) and L˜ = L(U˜).
pL(l) =
∑
x∈X
qX(x)pL|X(l|x)
(a)
=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)
∑
u∈U :l(u)=l
pU |X(u|x)
=
∑
u∈U :l(u)=l
∑
x∈X
qX(x)pU |X(u|x)
=
∑
u∈U :l(u)=l
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
qX(x)pU |X(u|x)
(b)
=
∑
u∈U :l(u)=l
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
qX(x)pU˜ |XEQ(u|xi)
=
∑
u∈U :l(u)=l
k∑
i=1
pU˜ |XEQ(u|xi)
∑
x∈Xi
qX(x)
(c)
=
∑
u∈U :l(u)=l
k∑
i=1
pU˜ |XEQ(u|xi)pXEQ(xi)
=
k∑
i=1
pXEQ(xi)
∑
u∈U :l(u)=l
pU˜ |XEQ(u|xi)
=
k∑
i=1
pXEQ(xi)pL˜|XEQ(l|xi)
= pL˜(l).
Equality (a) follows from the fact that l(u), the length of u, is a deterministic function of u. In (b) we used our
definition of the encoder pU˜ |XEQ(u|xi) = pU |X(u|x), where xi is the representative element of the equivalence classXi. We also used the definition of pXEQ(xi) =
∑
x∈Xi qX(x) in (c).
It follows from Lemma 2 that, to study the communication complexity of secure computation of (qXY , qZ|XY ), it
is enough to study the communication complexity of secure computation of the reduced problem (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ).
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF CLAIM 1
⇒: Let c : XEQ → {0, 1}∗ be a proper coloring of the vertices of GEQ that Alice and Bob agree upon. We
will give a pair of encoder-decoder (pU |XEQ , pZ|UY ) that securely computes (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ). Our encoder will
be a deterministic map, which is defined as pU |XEQ(u|x) := 1{u=c(x)}. The alphabet of U is U = {a ∈ {0, 1}∗ :
∃x ∈ XEQ s.t. c(x) = a}. We define our decoder as pZ|UY (z|u, y) := pZ|XEQY (z|x, y), for any x ∈ XEQ such
that c(x) = u and qXEQY (x, y) > 0. The decoder is well-defined, since c is a proper coloring (if x, x
′ are such
that c(x) = c(x′), then {x, x′} /∈ EEQ; therefore, for every (y, z) ∈ Y × Z , qZ|XEQY (z|x, y) = qZ|XEQY (z|x′, y),
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whenever qXEQY (x, y) > 0, qXEQY (x
′, y) > 0). Note that this pair of encoder-decoder (pU |XEQ , pZ|UY ) correctly
computes (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ). It also satisfies privacy against both users. Privacy against Alice follows from the fact
that our encoder is a deterministic function, in which U is deterministic function of XEQ, which implies that the
Markov chain U−XEQ−(Y, Z) trivially holds. Privacy against Bob follows from the fact that XEQ is a deterministic
function of (Y, Z); see Remark 7.
⇐: Fix a code C = (pU |XEQ , pZ|UY ) that securely computes (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ), i.e., the induced joint distribution
pXEQY UZ = qXEQY pU |XEQpZ|UY (150)
satisfies the two Markov chains U − XEQ − (Y,Z) and U − (Y,Z) − XEQ, which correspond to privacy against
Alice and privacy against Bob, respectively. Now we show that, without loss of generality, we can always take the
encoder pU |XEQ to be a deterministic map.
First note that privacy against Alice U − XEQ − (Y,Z) implies that U − (XEQ, Y ) − Z is a Markov chain.
This follows from 0 = I(U ;Y, Z|XEQ) ≥ I(U ;Z|XEQ, Y ) and the fact that conditional mutual information is
always non-negative. The Markov chain U − (XEQ, Y ) − Z implies that, for every x ∈ XEQ, y ∈ Y such that
qXEQY (x, y) > 0, we have
qZ|XEQY (z|x, y) = pZ|UXEQY (z|u, x, y),
for all u ∈ U s.t. pU |X(u|x) > 0 (151)
= pZ|UY (z|u, y). (152)
In (152) we used the (150) to write pZ|UXEQY (z|u, x, y) = pZ|UY (z|u, y). It follows from (151)-(152) that, for each
x ∈ XEQ, if we pick an arbitrary uˆ ∈ U such that pU |X(uˆ|x) > 0, and define our encoder as E(x) := uˆ (and leave
the decoder as before), then the resulting encoder-decoder pair (E(XEQ), pZ|UY ) computes (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ) with
zero-error. Note that (E(XEQ), pZ|UY ) satisfies privacy against both users: privacy against Alice comes from the
fact that the above-defined encoder U = E(XEQ) is a deterministic function of Alice’s input XEQ, which implies
that the Markov chain U −XEQ − (Y, Z) trivially holds; privacy against Bob follows from the fact that XEQ is a
deterministic function of (Y,Z) (see Remark 7), which implies that the Markov chain U − (Y, Z)−XEQ trivially
holds.
Note that the encoder pU |XEQ in the given code C may be a randomized function of Alice’s input, but once we
fix the random coins of the encoder, the encoder becomes deterministic. For fixed random coins ~r of the encoder,
let E~r : XEQ → U denote the resulting deterministic encoder, and let C~r = (E~r(XEQ), pZ|UY ) denote the resulting
secure code with this deterministic encoder. As argued above, for every choice of random coins ~r of the encoder,
the code C~r securely computes (qXEQY , qZ|XEQY ). Since C~r is a secure code with zero-error, the coloring defined
by c~r(x) := E~r(x), ∀x ∈ XEQ will be a proper coloring of the vertices of GEQ. Run through the possible random
coins ~r of the encoder; this will produce a random coloring (c~r)~r of the vertices, where for any randomness ~r, the
corresponding coloring c~r is a proper coloring.
APPENDIX G
PROOFS OF CLAIMS 2 & 3
Proof of Claim 2: We prove this by contradiction. Suppose ~α(y)i 6= ~α(y
′)
j and U (y)i ∩ U (y
′)
j 6= φ. Let u ∈
U (y)i ∩ U (y
′)
j . Define two sets Supp(~α
(y)
i ) = {x ∈ X : ~α(y)i (x) > 0} and Supp(~α(y
′)
j ) = {x ∈ X : ~α(y
′)
j (x) > 0}.
We analyze two cases, one when these two sets are equal, and the other, when they are not.
Case 1. Supp(~α(y)i ) = Supp(~α
(y′)
j ): since ~α
(y)
i and ~α
(y′)
j are distinct probability vectors with same support, there
must exist x and x′ such that ~α(y)i (x) > 0, ~α
(y′)
j (x) > 0, ~α
(y)
i (x
′) > 0, ~α(y
′)
j (x
′) > 0, and ~α
(y)
i (x
′)
~α
(y)
i (x)
6= ~α
(y′)
j (x
′)
~α
(y′)
j (x)
. Since
~α
(y)
i (x) > 0, ~α
(y)
i (x
′) > 0, we have qZ|XY (z|x, y) > 0 and qZ|XY (z|x′, y) > 0 for every z ∈ Z(y)i . Similarly, since
~α
(y′)
j (x) > 0, ~α
(y′)
j (x
′) > 0, we have qZ|XY (z′|x, y′) > 0 and qZ|XY (z′|x′, y′) > 0 for every z′ ∈ Z(y
′)
j . Note that
~α
(y)
i (x
′)
~α
(y)
i (x)
=
qZ|XY (z|x′,y)
qZ|XY (z|x,y) and
~α
(y′)
j (x
′)
~α
(y′)
j (x)
=
qZ|XY (z′|x′,y′)
qZ|XY (z′|x,y′) , where, by hypothesis,
qZ|XY (z|x′,y)
qZ|XY (z|x,y) 6=
qZ|XY (z′|x′,y′)
qZ|XY (z′|x,y′) .
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Since u ∈ U (y)i , there exists z ∈ Z(y)i such that p(u, z|y) > 0. This implies – by privacy against Bob – that
p(u, z|x, y) > 0 and p(u, z|x′, y) > 0. Consider pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) and expand it as follows:
pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) = qZ|XY (z|x, y)pU |XY Z(u|x, y, z)
= qZ|XY (z|x, y)pU |Y Z(u|y, z) (153)
Since pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) > 0, all the terms above are non-zero and well-defined. In the last equality we used privacy
against Bob to write pU |XY Z(u|x, y, z) = pU |Y Z(u|y, z). Now expand pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) in another way as follows:
pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) = pU |XY (u|x, y)pZ|UXY (z|u, x, y)
= pU |XY (u|x)pZ|UY (z|u, y) (154)
Again, all the terms above are non-zero and well-defined because pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) > 0. We used U −X − Y to
write pU |XY (u|x, y) = pU |X(u|x) and Z − (U, Y )−X to write pZ|UXY (z|u, x, y) = pZ|UY (z|u, y) in (154). Now
comparing (153) and (154) gives the following:
qZ|XY (z|x, y)pU |Y Z(u|y, z) = pU |X(u|x)pZ|UY (z|u, y) (155)
Since pUZ|XY (u, z|x′, y) > 0, we can apply the same arguments as above with pUZ|XY (u, z|x′, y) and get the
following:
qZ|XY (z|x′, y)pU |Y Z(u|y, z) = pU |X(u|x′)pZ|UY (z|u, y) (156)
Note that all the terms on both sides of (155) and (156) are non-zero. Dividing (155) by (156) gives the following:
qZ|XY (z|x, y)
qZ|XY (z|x′, y)
=
pU |X(u|x)
pU |X(u|x′)
. (157)
Similarly, since u ∈ U (y′)j , there exists z′ ∈ Z(y
′)
j such that p(u, z
′|y′) > 0. This implies – by privacy against
Bob – that p(u, z′|x, y′) > 0 and p(u, z′|x′, y′) > 0. Applying the above arguments with p(u, z′|x, y′) > 0 and
p(u, z′|x′, y′) > 0 gives
qZ|XY (z′|x, y′)
qZ|XY (z′|x′, y′)
=
pU |X(u|x)
pU |X(u|x′)
. (158)
Comparing (157) and (158) gives qZ|XY (z|x,y)qZ|XY (z|x′,y) =
qZ|XY (z′|x,y′)
qZ|XY (z′|x′,y′) , which is a contradiction.
Case 2. Supp(~α(y)i ) 6= Supp(~α(y
′)
j ): assume, without loss of generality, that Supp(~α
(y)
i ) \ Supp(~α(y
′)
j ) 6= φ. Let
x ∈ Supp(~α(y)i ) \ Supp(~α(y
′)
j ). This implies that ~α
(y)
i (x) > 0 and ~α
(y′)
j (x) = 0. Since Supp(~α
(y′)
j ) 6= φ (because
~α
(y′)
j is not a zero vector), there exists x
′ ∈ Supp(~α(y′)j ) such that ~α(y
′)
j (x
′) > 0. Note that ~α(y)i (x) > 0 implies
pZ|XY (z|x, y) > 0 for every z ∈ Z(y)i ; ~α(y
′)
j (x) = 0 implies qZ|XY (z
′|x, y′) = 0 for every z′ ∈ Z(y′)j ; and
~α
(y′)
j (x
′) > 0 implies qZ|XY (z′|x′, y′) > 0 for every z′ ∈ Z(y
′)
j . Since u ∈ U (y)i ∩ U (y
′)
j , there exists z ∈ Z(y)i and
z′ ∈ Z(y′)j such that p(u, z|y) > 0 and p(u, z′|y′) > 0. These imply – by privacy against Bob – that p(u, z|x, y) > 0
and p(u, z′|x′, y′) > 0. Now consider p(u, z′|x, y′) and expand it as follows:
p(u, z′|x, y′) = p(u|x, y′)p(z′|x, y′, u) (159)
= p(u|x)p(z′|y′, u) (160)
We used the Markov chain U−X−Y to write p(u|x, y′) = p(u|x), where p(u|x) > 0 because p(u, z|x, y) > 0. We
used the Markov chain Z−(Y,U)−X to write p(z′|x, y′, u) = p(z′|y′, u) in (159), which is greater than zero because
p(u, z′|x′, y′) > 0. Putting all these together in (160) gives p(u, z′|x, y′) > 0, which implies qZ|XY (z′|x, y′) > 0,
a contradiction.
Proof of Claim 3: Since the Markov chain U −X − Y holds, we have that the set of messages that Alice
sends to Bob are same for all inputs of Bob. Now it follows from Claim 2 that for every y ∈ Y we can partition
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One-round secure protocol
Input: Alice has x ∈ X and Bob has y ∈ Y .
Output: Bob outputs z with probability qZ|XY (z|x, y).
Protocol
1) Both Alice and Bob agree on an element in the alphabet Y , say y1, beforehand.
2) Alice sends ui to Bob with probability
∑
z∈Z(y)i qZ|XY (z|x, y1).
3) Upon receiving ui, Bob fixes any element x′ for which α
(y)
i (x
′) > 0, and outputs z with probability
qZ|XY (z|x′,y)∑
z∈Z(y)
i
qZ|XY (z|x′,y) .
Fig. 6: A one-round secure protocol.
the set of all possible messages U as follows: U = U (y)1
⊎U (y)2 ⊎ . . .⊎U (y)k(y), where U (y)i is as defined earlier in
(53). Consider any two y, y′ ∈ Y . We have
U (y)1
⊎
U (y)2
⊎
. . .
⊎
U (y)k(y) = U
(y′)
1
⊎
U (y′)2
⊎
. . .
⊎
U (y′)k(y′). (161)
First observe that k(y) = k(y′). Otherwise, there exists i ∈ [k(y)] and j ∈ [k(y′)] such that U (y)i ∩ U (y
′)
j 6= φ and
~α
(y)
i 6= ~α(y
′)
j , which contradicts Claim 2. From now on we denote k(y) by k for every y ∈ Y .
Suppose {~α(y)1 , ~α(y)2 , . . . , ~α(y)k } 6= {~α(y
′)
1 , ~α
(y′)
2 , . . . , ~α
(y′)
k }. It means that there exists an i ∈ [k] such that ~α(y)i /∈
{~α(y′)1 , ~α(y
′)
2 , . . . , ~α
(y′)
k }. Since U (y)i is associated with ~α(y)i , we have by (161) that U (y)i /∈ U (y
′)
1
⊎U (y′)2 ⊎ . . .⊎U (y′)k .
This contradicts (161).
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 9
⇒: (1) has been shown in Claim 3. (2) follows from the following argument: take any x ∈ X and consider the
following set of equalities: ∑
z∈Z(y)i
qZ|XY (z|x, y) (a)=
∑
u∈Ui
pU |XY (u|x, y)
(b)
=
∑
u∈Ui
pU |XY (u|x, y′)
(c)
=
∑
z∈Z(y′)i
qZ|XY (z|x, y′),
where (a) and (c) follow from the fact that Bob’s output Z belongs to Z(y)i , when his input is y (or belongs to
Z(y′)i , when his input is y′) if and only if the message U that Alice sends to Bob belongs to Ui. (b) follows from
the Markov chain U −X − Y .
⇐: We show this direction by giving a secure protocol in Figure 6. Now we prove that this protocol is perfectly
secure, i.e., it satisfies perfect correctness and perfect privacy.
Correctness: Suppose the protocol of Figure 6 produces an output according to the p.m.f. q(z|x, y). We show
below that p(z|xy) is equal to qZ|XY (z|x, y).
p(z|x, y) (162)
= p(z, ui|x, y) (163)
= p(ui|x, y)× p(z|ui, x, y)
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= p(ui|x)× p(z|ui, y) (164)
=
( ∑
z∈Z(y)i
qZ|XY (z|x, y1)
)
×
( qZ|XY (z|x′, y)∑
z∈Z(y)i qZ|XY (z|x′, y)
)
(165)
=
( ∑
z∈Z(y)i
qZ|XY (z|x, y)
)
×
( qZ|XY (z|x, y)∑
z∈Z(y)i qZ|XY (z|x, y)
)
(166)
= qZ|XY (z|x, y)
In (163) we assume that z ∈ Z(y)i , and (163) is an equality because the message that Alice sends to Bob is
a deterministic function of Bob’s input and output. In (164) we used the Markov chain U − X − Y to write
p(ui|x, y) = p(ui|x) and Z − (U, Y )−X to write p(z|ui, x, y) = p(z|ui, y). In (165) we substituted the values of
p(ui|x, y) and p(z|ui, y) from the protocol of Figure 6. In (166) we used the facts that
∑
z∈Z(y)i qZ|XY (z|x, y1) =∑
z∈Z(y)i qZ|XY (z|x, y) (which follows from the assumption – see the second item in the theorem statement) and
qZ|XY (z|x′,y)∑
z∈Z(y)
i
qZ|XY (z|x′,y) =
qZ|XY (z|x,y)∑
z∈Z(y)
i
qZ|XY (z|x,y) (which follows from the fact that the matrix A
(y)
i = ~α
(y)
i × ~γ(y)i , defined
earlier, is a rank-one matrix).
Privacy: we need to show that if pZ|XY (z|x1, y) > 0 and pZ|XY (z|x2, y) > 0 for some x1, x2, y, z, then for every ui,
p(ui|x1, y, z) = p(ui|x2, y, z) must hold. This follows because p(ui|x, y, z) = 1{z∈Z(y)i }, i.e., ui is a deterministic
function of (y, z) and is independent of Alice’s input.
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